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Abstract 
 
 
On October 16 2014, after over seven years, the European Union (EU) and the East Africa 
Community (EAC) concluded negotiations on a new comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA). However, the deadline for the conclusion was October 1 and as a conse-
quence EU removed the Community’s trade privileges that gave the region the possibility to 
export products to the EU markets duty and quota-free. 
This paper argues – based on Neo-Gramscian theory – that the EPA is result of a neoliberal 
hegemony, of which EU as a prime actor is promoting a neoliberal agenda. By both consent 
and cohesion is the EU able to pressure the EAC sign the EPA, which enforced market liber-
alisations and a strengthening of marked-based authority over state-authority.  We also 
show – through global value chain theory – how the local associations of exporters pushed 
for a speedy conclusion of the EPA. Not because they favoured its provisions, but because 
they did not want to lose the duty-free privileges that EU historically had granted to the EAC 
countries.   
Match fixing occurs as a match is played to a 
completely or partially pre-determined result. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
 
On October 1, 2014, after years of careful negotiations the East African Community 
(EAC) countries failed to agree on an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with 
the EU. The parties did manage to reach an agreement two weeks later, on October 16, 
but by then EU Regulation 527/2013 had already been put into effect “withdrew[ing 
...] Market Access Regulation’s benefits to those countries that had not taken the nec-
essary steps towards ratification of the Economic Partnership Agreements concluded 
with the EU” (EC, 2015a).  The Market Access Regulations (MAR) is ‘a temporary uni-
lateral scheme’ that provides the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP)1 
– of which the EAC is one of seven regions in – with duty-free and quota-free export-
access to EU until the ‘conclusion and application of the revised EPA’s’ (EC, 2014a & 
2015).  
The MAR had been initiated to give 
the APC countries favourable export 
and trade schemes during the early 
negotiations in 2007-8. With the 
withdrawal of the regulation, the 
EAC countries found themselves de-
moted to less lucrative trade agree-
ments. In earlier EPA-negotiations, 
with Namibia in Southern Africa, and with Fiji and Papua New Guinea in the Pacific, 
amongst others, EU’s tactics have been described as ‘bullying’ by some observers (Kwa, 
2007; PANG, 2013). During our fieldwork in Kenya, a director from a fresh produce 
export company shared this conception of EU’s negotiation tactics and the withdrawal 
of the MAR as amounting to bullying (Field notes, 2015). 
                                                             
1 The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) is an organisation created by the Georgetown 
Agreement in 1975. It is composed of 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific states, with all of them, save 
Cuba, signatories to the Cotonou Agreement, also known as the "ACP-EC Partnership Agreement" 
which binds them to the European Union (ACP, 2015). 
Picture 1: The EAC 
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The consequences were minor for most of the EAC countries as Uganda, Tanzania, 
Rwanda and Burundi – all categorised as ‘least developed countries’ or LDC’s – fell 
back to a special arrangement in EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) called 
'Everything but Arms' (EBA). The EBA arrangement from 2001 gives the world’s least 
developed countries a change to export to EU duty- and quota-free, and it thus give 
countries on this agreement the same advantages as the MAR (EC, 2014a). Kenya, the 
last member-state of the EAC, however, does not fall within the LDC category, and as 
a non-LDC, the country was removed from the duty-free MAR regime and transferred 
to the standard GSP where tariffs and duties apply (EC, 2014b). Given Kenya’s special 
situation as a non-LDC country the failure to reach an agreement before the deadline 
hit the country and its exporters especially hard: “the EU’s standard Generalised 
Scheme of Preferences for developing countries, […] means that there will be tariffs 
on some products originating in Kenya, such as cut flowers and vegetables” (Irakoze 
& Spoor, 2014). According to Harvard’s Atlas of Economic Complexity cut flower alone 
did account for 18 per cent of Kenya’s export in 2013, tea and coffee 22 per cent, and 
fruit and vegetables around 12 per cent. Around a third of all exports from Kenya went 
to the EU (Harvard, 2015). 
Therefore, while the EAC countries did reach an agreement with EU on October 16, 
the countries had already been withdrawn from the MAR and were not reinstated back 
into the preferable trade agreement right away. In Kenya’s case it took EU almost three 
months to make the necessary arrangements that allowed the country back onto the 
MAR regime of duty-free and quota-free exports of its products to the EU markets – 
something that was presented as a ‘Christmas gift’ from EU’s delegation to Kenya on 
December 24 (EU Kenya, 2014). 
According to the fresh produce director, Kenyan exporters had during those three 
months lost large parts of their EU marked-shares, which they would not be able to 
win back. His company alone had to terminate contracts with more than a thousand 
small-scale farmers who had otherwise supplied the company with fruits and vegeta-
bles (Field notes, 2015). In that sense Kenya’s three months without MAR access had 
a big impact on the country’s export to EU. Kenyan earnings from vegetables fell 18 
per cent, while cut flower only rose by 7 per  cent in 2014 (Masinde, 2015), at the same 
time Tanzania’s agrarian exports value grew by 38 per cent with “Vegetables export 
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volume and value ranked high, compared to spices, flowers, fruits and seeds” 
(Ihucha, 2015). 
How can we understand the EPA and its consequences from the perspective of global 
political economy? While the negotiations have been disastrous for many small-scale 
farmers as well as Kenyan exporters, the EPA is part of a larger global economy. The 
EPA’s originate from the Cotonou Agreement, which entered into force in 2003, and 
are a result of former agreements largely being at odds with WTO provisions regulat-
ing regional trade (Nilsson, 2002:439-440; Odongo, 2013:2). 
In this paper, we use a transnational historical materialism or Neo-Gramscian ap-
proach combined with Global Value Chain (GVC) theory to better understand the EPA 
between EU and the EAC within the global economy. We are especially interested in 
understanding why both EU and the EAC, particularly Kenya, wants to engage in this 
partnership agreement, as well as the political and economic reasons behind the agree-
ment. What consequences did EU’s approach have for the EAC countries and why are 
they, and especially Kenya, interested in a deal that might not be as beneficial to them 
as hoped (Bengtsson & Elgström, 2012)? 
Scholars have previously shown some interest in the EPA’s between EU and the ACP 
countries2, though much of this research were done in the years 2005-08 where the 
interim-EPA’s were negotiated. While most researchers have concentrated their ef-
forts on the EPA’s economic effects for the ACP countries or the initial negotiation 
processes, this newly concluded agreement – and the circumstances under which it 
came about – makes it relevant to re-evaluate the sentiments behind the EAC agree-
ment in this new light of hard-fought results. 
It would have been particular fascinating to look at the interest and consequences for 
all five EAC countries, the EAC as a whole, and the internal negotiations within the 
region – especially the rivalry between Kenya and Tanzania. These internal interests 
are not necessarily aligning and definitely had an impact on the deal and it process. 
The EAC’s exceeding of the October 1 deadline was partly due to prolonged negotia-
tions between the EAC countries (Chao-Blasto, 2015). However, this paper’s 
timeframe and the difficulty in obtaining the necessary empirical data from all the EAC 
                                                             
2 See amongst others: Hinkle & Schiff, 2004; Karingi et.al, 2005; Milner et al., 2005 & 2007; Stevens, 
2006; Bilal & Grynberg, 2007; Boysen & Matthews, 2008; Mohammad, 2008; Faber & Orbie, 2009; 
Khumalo & Mulleta, 2010; and Ngangjoh-Hodu & Matambalya, 2010. 
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countries render a comprehensive analysis of such a broad scope impossible. Instead, 
our efforts will be concentrated on Kenya given the country’s particular desperate sit-
uation during the final part of the negotiations. 
About half of the ACP countries3 have yet to agree on EPA agreements (DG Trade, 
2015b), and the EPA’s have received their fair share of criticism: 
[P]rematurely opening markets translates into African agricultural and non-agri-
cultural production finding it very difficult to compete with the most likely 
cheaper, perhaps better quality and even larger supply of goods and services from 
European countries (McDonald et al., 2013:i). 
Further, in 2013, the agreement was criticized in the Kenyan parliament, resulting in 
“skewed trade in favour of the EU Countries and that small scale growers would be 
adversely affected” (Kwa et al., 2014:42). Others have pointed to the fact that many of 
the countries that are affected by the EPA’s already have the possibility of duty- and 
quota-free export (i.e. due to agreements like the EBA) and that the impacts of the EPA 
will be minimal (Stevens et al., 2008). This criticism further makes it interesting to 
examine the EAC agreed to conclude the EPA.  
1.1 Research and Working Questions 
To examine the EPA between EU and the EAC we want to understand why EU wants 
the agreement and why Kenyan and the rest of the EAC countries would accept an 
agreement that is not necessarily beneficial for the region’s economy. For this have we 
asked the following research question:  
How can we understand the European Union’s interest in the Economic Partnership 
Agreement with the East African Community, and – conversely – the interest in con-
cluding the agreement from the East African Community? 
Reaching and formulating this paper’s arguments have been a long complicated pro-
cess. In order to qualify our research, we have divided the analysis into two parts:  
 How can we understand the EPA as part of a global hegemonic order and how 
is such an order organized in regard of production and trade? 
 How can we understand Kenya’s incentive to sign the EPA? 
 
                                                             
3 The Pacific group (excluding Fiji and Papua New Guinea), the Eastern & Southern Africa, and the 
Central African region has yet to conclude an EPA – due to disagreement between the regions and EU 
or – for the latter region – stability issues.  
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The first question will focus on the EPA as an EU invention, while the second question 
is concerned with the EPA from a Kenyan perspective. These two questions can hope-
fully assist readers in tracking the common argument throughout the paper, as it un-
folds. 
1.2 The Papers Main Argument 
Given Kenya’s special situation as a non-LDC and thus the only country that lost duty 
and quota-free export to EU and to limit our fieldwork efforts to just one of the EAC 
countries have we chosen to concentrate our research on Kenya. This does result in 
some limitations to our conclusions, as some of the results will be applicable to the 
entire EAC while other findings will be limited to Kenya. 
This paper argues that the EPA is part of a neoliberal hegemonic world order. The 
agreement between EU and the EAC can be understood as part of a larger effort within 
this hegemony comprised of the world’s transnational capitalist class to promote a ne-
oliberal agenda. By making the EAC sign the EPA, EU promoted continued liberalisa-
tion and a strengthening of marked-based world economy, in which many western 
firms dominate the value chains. While it is too early to say with any certainty if this 
will be a bad deal for Kenya and the rest of the EAC countries we argue that the coun-
tries had little chose to resist the full EPA due to the interim EPA agreement. The in-
terim EPA, with the MAR regime combined with earlier trade agreements meant that 
Kenya and the EAC countries had already gain extensive advantages and access the to 
the EU markets. These advantage could they hardly afford to lose thus making it vir-
tually impossible for the EAC countries, and especially for Kenya as a non-DLC, to 
decline the EPA, no matter its local consequences. 
While the interest in signing the EPA still were present for both EU and the EAC, we 
argue that these interests share very little in terms of incentive to conclude the EPA. 
Instead, there are highly asymmetric reasons behind the two parties’ interest in con-
cluding the agreement. EU have ideological reasons to promote free trade. The EAC – 
and especially Kenya as a non-LDC – had an interest in not losing the favourable terms 
of export to EU, one of their primary markets. As Kenyan exporters had gained access 
and established themselves on the EU markets through the MAR regime. Kenya was, 
in order to secure this continued access, eventually forced to sign the EPA almost no 
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matter how little the agreement would consider their preferences. Even the LDC coun-
tries – with their marked access secured without the EPA have a profound interest in 
signing the agreement, as they would not be able to develop their economies without 
then losing their access to the European markets. 
1.3 Outline of the Paper 
Having introduces the paper’s topic and content in the paragraph above; this final sec-
tion aims to provide an overview of this paper. In Chapter 2, Methodology, we present 
our theoretical approach in detail as well as our theoretical framework and how we use 
it. The chapter also reflects on our fieldwork and the methods we have made use of. 
Chapter 3, History Matters, provides a run-through of the historical relationship be-
tween Europa and East Africa. It also shows how the trade agreements between EU 
and East Africa have been connected in the past five decades.  
Chapter 4, EU Hegemony, marks the beginning of the main analysis, in which we show 
how the global hegemonic has shaped the trade agreements and the EPA between the 
EU, a part of the hegemony, and the EAC. The chapter also shows how governance of 
global value chains are influenced by the hegemonic world order. Chapter 5, A Kenyan 
Non-Decision, contains the second part of our analysis. Here we focus on Kenya and 
the EAC’s interest in the EPA. We show that Kenya’s elite is influenced by the hegem-
ony and Kenya’s exporters are positioned in the global value chain in a position they 
do not want to lose. Chapter 6, But What If…, is a short discussing of key issues that 
could have influenced the EPA, but that we have not been able to include fully in this 
paper’s analysis. Finally, Chapter 7 rounds up the paper with its final conclusion. 
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Chapter 2  
Methodology 
 
 
This chapter aims to present our methodological and theoretical considerations to cre-
ate the necessary understanding of how we have approached the above-mentioned re-
search- and working questions. We begin by outlining our theoretical approach includ-
ing the considerations and challenges following a specific theoretical approach brings 
with it. The second part of this chapter provides the reader with a presentation of the 
more specific theories and authors whom will be relied upon during the analyses and 
how their contribution to this paper have be used. The third, and final, part is dedi-
cated to reflections on the research methods we have used in order to collect our data, 
and the limitations this particular field of study have had. 
2.1 Theoretical Approach 
This paper positions itself within the branch of international scholarship referred to 
as Global Political Economy (GPE). As such, certain methodological choices have al-
ready been taken. Palan (2012) identifies GPE as a ‘transdisciplinary effort’ spanning 
over the fields of political economy, international relations and political science. While 
the terms are used interchangeably, GPE differs according to Palan from International 
Political Economy (IPE) in the sense that the latter is a sub-field to political science 
and international relations, rather than spanning multiple fields. Palan do point to a 
number of other differences between IPE and GPE. The most important difference be-
ing that standard (or neo-classic) economics make up the orthodoxy of the IPE field; 
in the latter field of GPE more diverse and heterodoxy theoretical approaches to eco-
nomics, including constructive, Marxist and libidinal ones, largely prevails (Palan, 
2012:1-3). Consequently, as we identify our work within the field of GPE we positions 
ourselves away from standard economics and in the group of alternatives.  
Within this group of alternatives, our study’s theoretic approach is based on transna-
tional historical materialism. As such, any analysis of the social world must be based 
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on an understanding of the way humans have organised the production and reproduc-
tion on our material life. Trade agreements such as the EPA’s between regions are thus 
understood as social and historical process and it is stressed that they should be ana-
lysed as such. Transnational historical materialism is inspired by Neo-Gramscian 
ideas. Most importantly for this paper, the idea of an ideological structure of particular 
historical configurations of capital (Overbeek, 2012:165-8). Here the ideological struc-
ture is defined as:  
the process of the accumulation of capital; the agency is that of the concrete social 
forces originating from the sphere of production relations and struggling continu-
ously over the direction of the accumulation process, over the role and nature of 
the state, and over the world order (Overbeek, 2012:168). 
Within such a perspective, we view the EPA as part of – or rather a result – of EU and 
the EAC’s struggle over production and accumulation of capital, and over the consti-
tution of the current world order. 
The concepts within transnational historical materialism that have influenced our ap-
proach are especially the ideas of hegemony and world order. Neo-Gramscians view 
hegemony not as domination of state power, as traditional realist scholars of interna-
tional relations usually do, but as an economic world order were a state or states “di-
rectly exploits others but [also] an order which most other states (or at least those 
within the reach of the hegemony) could find compatible with their interest” (Cox, 
1996:136). Hegemony thus thrives on a balance of consent and cohesion. In this world 
order, the hegemony will spread its norms, politics and policies to peripheral coun-
tries, where these will adapt economic, social and cultural aspects from the hegemonic 
core. Cox’ inspiration follows from Gramsci:  
[...] when the impetus of progress is not tightly linked to a vast local economy de-
velopment which is artificially limited and repressed, but is instead the reflection 
of international developments which transmit their ideological currents to the pe-
riphery...” (Gramsci, 1971:116).  
This form of world order is hence not only an order amongst states, but also in and of 
the world economy. It connects social classes in different countries in complicated in-
ternational social relations across borders. These relations between the national ruling 
classes, bourgeoisies and working classes transform into global social, economic and 
political structures through the struggles over the production and accumulation of 
capital (Cox, 1996:133-137).  
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2.2 Use of Theories 
Understanding the world in the sense of a hegemony, means that it is necessary to 
identify the characteristics of this world order. Cox provides the theoretical tools for 
this himself, as one of the ways in which the world order is expressed through interna-
tional organisations. International organisations, like EU, argues Cox expresses the 
world order through ‘mechanisms of hegemony’: 
(1) the international institutions embody the rules which facilitate the expansion 
of hegemonic world orders; (2) they are themselves the product of the hegemonic 
world order; (3) the ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order; (4) the 
co-opt the elites from the peripheral countries; and (5) they absorb counterhege-
monic ideas (Cox, 1996:138). 
The first mechanism notice that the states and international institutions that have es-
tablished the hegemony support rules that governs the world economy and that these 
rules’ aim is to expand the hegemony’s reach. Cox notes that rules governing world 
monetary and trade relations are particular important as they heavily influences the 
production and reproduction of our material life. The second mechanism states that 
international organisations often are created by the states that established the hegem-
ony to help promote and expand the hegemony itself. Thirdly, international organisa-
tions make guidelines and define policies for states at a national level and thus legiti-
macies institutions and practices of are favourable to the hegemony. The fourth mech-
anism is that individuals – typically from the peripheral – who want to ‘change the 
system’ by working within the international organisations are ‘swallowed’ by them and 
forced to work within the structures of the hegemony. Lastly, the international organ-
isation absorb many of the anti-hegemonic ideas and transform them into its own, 
thus neutralising opposition4. 
While transnational historical materialism is not limited to the above-mentioned con-
cepts of hegemonic world order and mechanisms of international organisation, these 
parts of the approach are the ones that will affect this paper’s analysis most directly5.  
                                                             
4 We do not use the concept of counter-hegemony further in our analysis, but it can shortly be de-
scribed as “creating alternative institutions and alternative intellectual resources within the existing 
society” (Cox, 1996:128) to establish an alternative state and society, which could then spread new 
hegemonic ideas. 
5 We have left out certain Gramscian ideas irrelevant for our analysis, such as: historic blocs, which 
forms the basis of consent to a certain social order is more valuable for historical analyses of different 
historical hegemonies; passive revolutions, which is a term used to describe the flow of norms and 
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Plenty of authors have built upon Cox’ use of Gramsci’s idea of hegemony6. We are 
using a few of those to qualify our use of the term ‘hegemony’. While hegemonies are 
also seen through the mechanism performed by states or international organisations 
does Cox argue that hegemonies are built by classes (Cox, 1996:132-134). Robinson  
(2005) argues that, “[h]egemony is exercised by social groups” (Robinson, 2005:564), 
not by states and to talk about British or US hegemony only makes sense in that it is 
shorthand for British or US capitalists, their ‘allied strata’ of state managers and mid-
dle-class sectors – all within the transnational world capitalism (Robinson, 2005:564-
565). Further, Nunn & Price (2004), in their discussion of world hegemony, points to 
Stephen Gill’s (1998) description of hegemony as “offering a privileged position to 
specific classes and class factions” (Nunn & Price, 2004:205). Both Robinson and 
Nunn & Price builds their notions on hegemony from the same Neo-Gramscian idea 
as Cox. Gill concludes his own article by pointing to the fact that international organi-
sations are not completely independent entities as both powerful individuals and 
states influence them. Besides these organisations are powerful states such as the 
Group of Seven (7G) part of shaping the world hegemony (Gill, 1998:37).  
In order to capture that the states and international organisations are not the sole heg-
emonic actors, but more a symptom of the hegemonic class who have built these insti-
tutions we use Robinson’s concept of a transnational capitalist class (TCC). The TCC 
is made up by owners of transnational corporations (TNC’s), private financial institu-
tions, managers of transnational capital as well as ‘the cadre, bureaucratic managers 
and technicians who administer’ international organisations such as IMF, the World 
Bank and WTO as well as the strongest states and their leaders (Robinson, 2005:564-
565). 
To summarise, using a theoretical approach that provides us with a neo-Gramscian 
understanding of hegemony and global economy as production and reproduction of 
material life, we also use a number of other concepts derived from that tradition. Es-
pecially important is the mechanisms of hegemonic international organisations and 
the idea of the transnational capitalist class. 
                                                             
politics from the hegemonic centre to the peripheral countries; and the categorisation of different 
forms of states, as we a looking at supranational institutions. 
6 See amongst others: Gill & Law (1989); Burnham (1991); Gill (1993) & (1998); Bieler & Morton 
(2001); Nunn & Price (2004); Robinson (2005); Bieler et.al, ed. (2006); Carroll (2007); McNally & 
Schwarzmantel, ed. (2009) 
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2.2.1 Global Value Chain Theory 
This paper’s task is to understand the EPA’s and EU’s and their African partner’s in-
terest in signing the EPA. However, while the governments of the EU and EAC coun-
tries are eventually the parties signing the trade agreement “[t]rade experts have 
learned to retort that countries don’t trade, firms do” (Cuiriak et.al, 2011:2). There-
fore, while the EPA is negotiation through supranational organisations firms do the 
actual trade between the regions. Realising this, we want to set up a theoretical frame-
work that enable us to understand both the political process and the trade between the 
regions. At the same time, we would like to use theories that fit together with our trans-
national historical materialism understanding of the world and the notion of hegem-
ony. Cox (1996) describes well what kind outlook these theories should have to fit this 
framework: 
Hegemony at the international level is thus not merely an order among states. It 
is an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production which 
penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes of production 
(Cox, 1996:137). 
For a theoretical framework that can explain trade relations and trade agreements in 
this light, we draw on Global Value Chain (GVC) analysis7. GVC analysis is well suited 
to examine the global economy as modes of production, rather than an order among 
states. At the same time, GVC analysis grasps the notion of firms as social actors per-
form the accumulation of capital – production, value adding, and trade – within the 
current hegemonic order. While regional organisations such as EU and the EAC 
mainly struggle to govern companies’ accumulation of capital through regulations and 
trade agreements.  
Gibbon et al. (2008) argues two broader academic traditions can be identified on how 
the global economy is governed as alternatives to GVC. The first, ‘mainstream inter-
national economy approaches’ which “posits the problem of global economic govern-
ance in terms of institutions and is chiefly concerned with how effective they are vis-
à-vis regional and national governance systems”. The second approach is the ‘radical 
political economy’ approach, which focuses on “the relation between global capital 
(specifically, transnational corporations) and these same [international] institu-
tions, […] which are understood to represent the interests of corporations as well as 
of some governments” (Gibbon et al., 2008:2). Especially mainstream international 
                                                             
7 Formerly known as Global Commodity Chain analysis. 
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economy, with its heavy emphasis on states, is far from the transnational historical 
materialism and the idea of hegemony being something other than ‘an order among 
states’, which corresponds so well with GVC analysis. Gibbon’s definition of the radical 
approach is closer to a global economy and a world order dominated by the modes of 
production. However, what GVC analysis adds to this is a much clearer concept of 
trade’s role in the global economic where trade, global politics, and the international 
institutions is all part of the ‘modes of production’. 
In order to use GVC analysis to understand EU’s interest in the EPA and Kenya’s in-
centive to conclude it, we do have to stray away from the traditional use of GVC anal-
ysis. Instead of making an analysis of a certain chain for a specific commodity or show-
ing how lead firms creates entry barriers protecting lead firm positions, we are only 
using some concepts derived from GVC analysis in our framework. We use these con-
cepts to understand how global trade is structured and functions and how it is gov-
erned by international organisations as well as by the firms themselves. We therefore 
refer to ‘GVC theory’ and not ‘GVC analysis’. 
As [Global Value Chain analysis] developed over the course of the last decade, 
however, GVC analysis has moved away from its world-systems origins, focusing 
on the elaboration of a firm-centered conceptualization of governance instead of 
delineating a general capitalist or systemic logic driving commodity chains (Gib-
bon et al., 2008:2). 
This development has provided GVC analysis with some strong qualities to identify 
positions of power in economic relations (Gibbon & Ponte, 2005), that – together with 
our understanding of them – have to be introduced before elaborating on our use of 
and contribution to the GVC theory. 
The linkage between the lead firms and the suppliers are said to be the nexus within 
standard GVC analysis (Gibbon & Ponte, 2005:79). In our context of the EPA, the lead 
firms are typically placed in Europe and the suppliers in the EAC countries. That said 
it is also possible to identify local lead firms and local suppliers within the EAC coun-
tries. An example of this could be local small-scale farmers supplying larger local fresh 
produce exporters, who export their products to European supermarkets. 
Further, all the value chains we include between EU and the EAC can be identified as 
buyer-driven chains. The chains are considered to be found in more labour-intensive 
sectors, where production is usually outsourced while branding, design and marketing 
are left to the lead firms of the chains. The buyer-driven chains also have low barriers 
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for entering into production and thus the production part of the chain becomes low-
profit and noncore. Meaning that production is competitive and decentralised where 
suppliers and subcontractors, usually located in developing countries, can easily be 
changed by the lead firms. These chains are usually found in clothing, footwear, toys, 
vegetables, and fresh fruit (Gibbon & Ponte, 2005:76 & 79). 
Besides the linkage between lead firms and suppliers, and the buyer-driven chain, an-
other contribution from GVC theory to this paper is the concept of upgrading: 
Upgrading is then about acquiring capabilities and accessing new market seg-
ments through participating in particular chains (Humphrey 2003a). The argu-
ment is that upgrading in various forms can be effectively stimulated through 
learning from lead firms rather than through interactions between firms in the 
same functional position (horizontal transfer in clusters) or within the frameworks 
of common business systems or national systems of innovation (Gibbon & Ponte, 
2005:89). 
Upgrading can be achieved in different ways, through process upgrading, product up-
grading, functional upgrading or intersectoral upgrading (Gibbon & Ponte, 2005:89). 
Thus, one possibility for the EAC countries to achieve upgrading would be by increase 
the level of value adding to the products currently being produced. Though upgrading 
seems more relevant for suppliers, European firms can also achieve upgrading and one 
assumption we will examine in the analysis is the possibilities for upgrading for both 
EAC and EU firms through the EPA. 
Besides adopting the way GVC analysis understands the world, we are relying on three 
core concepts of GVC theory: The division of labour into lead firms, firms that are both 
global suppliers and local lead firms and local suppliers; buyer-driven chains; and up-
grading. 
2.2.2 Global Value Chain Governance 
Although the global value chains’ internal governance is organised within the chain by 
lead firms and the suppliers themselves, Gereffi, Humphrey & Sturgeon (2004) have 
argued that governance is depending on different ‘forms of coordination’ between the 
different actors and their different positions within in the chains (Quoted in Gibbon & 
Ponte, 2005:81-83). Going further into the governance of the buyer-driven global 
value chain Gibbon & Ponte (2005) argues that lead firms use the enforcement of 
standards in the different functions along the value chains to internally govern the 
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chains. These standards can provide lead firms with a form of indirect control over 
suppliers through a ‘hands-off’ approach:  
Increasingly, lead firms are devising forms of “hands-off” governance that are ex-
ercised on the basis of setting of precise standards, modularization of production 
specifications, and /or codification of suppliers’ knowledge requirements (Gibbon 
& Ponte, 2005:83). 
The authors have themselves criticised the GVC analysis frameworks on a number of 
issues. Most important for our analysis of the EPA have been that GVC analysis “re-
tains the blindness of external regulative conditions that represent a central weak-
ness of the original global commodity chain approach” (Gibbon & Ponte, 2005:84-
85). Together with Vestergaard, they expanded on the governing of value chains 
through standards, and included an effort to take external factors – outside the chains 
– into account: 
While adopting a broad definition of standards, we do differentiate between stand-
ards set by public authority (and thus embedded in the regulation) and those that 
are voluntary, thus are not based on the sovereign authority of the state, so not 
requiring compliance and state sanctions in case of non-compliance (Ponte et al., 
2011:2). 
These standards are being differentiated, by the authors, between a) formal standards, 
and b) voluntary standards that the lead firms have implemented themselves, de-
manding that their suppliers follow. These latter standards could be due to customers’ 
demands, a matter of selling ecological goods, etc. The formal standards is a result of 
governing authorities like governments, international organisations or networks ex-
erting authority. Therefore, it is also the formal standard setting that is most relevant 
to our research of the EPA. However, there has been a recognition that private author-
ities have increased and that:  
standards are part of a broader set of instruments that are said to be advancing 
‘private authority’ in governing economic, social and environmental phenomena. 
But they also play an important role in shaping regulation and ‘proper’ policy mak-
ing (Attributed to multiple authors in Ponte et al., 2011:4).  
The private authorities are said to have an effect on the public authorities in many 
ways, e.g. through lobbying. Reversely, some voluntary standards are implemented 
because intergovernmental governance on trade is complex and often takes time to 
complete; therefore do the voluntary standards sometimes work as the for-runner for 
new initiatives of formal standards (Ponte et al., 2011:4-7). 
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This approach largely solve the issue that GVC analysis do not consider external regu-
lation. Ponte et al.’s efforts, however, are based on discourse and on how the authority 
of standards are changing from public order to more private oriented one, to underline 
that governance are affected by the re-articulation of standards (Ponte et al., 2011:1-
8). This is to some extent conflicting with our transnational historical materialism, and 
we have therefore deemed it necessary to use the concepts of formal and voluntary 
standards of Ponte et al.’s framework, but instead of making a discursive analysis we 
have combined GVC theory with the notion of Neo-Gramscian hegemony.  
2.2.3 Hegemonic Value Chain Order 
We have illustrated our framework below (figure 1) and this section will go more into 
detail with the specific way we combine our transnational historic materialism with 
GVC theory.  
As illustrated, we do operate with a global hegemony, historically established through 
strong states and international organisations. This hegemony is controlled by a hege-
monic class – in our paper a transnational capitalist class – who exercise their influ-
ence as leaders of governments, international organisations and transnational corpo-
rations. The hegemony spread norms, politics and policies through a number of mech-
anism, which among other things influences the global value chains. Externally, the 
Figure 1 
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hegemonic norms, politics and policies influences the governance of value chains, in-
cluding establishing formal standards, through arrangements, such as trade agree-
ments and hence the EPA we are examining. Internally, lead firms governs the value 
chains by setting voluntary standards that suppliers and other firms further down in 
the chains must comply with. 
The first part of our analysis, chapter four, begins with establishing the characteristics 
of the current hegemonic order, as well as EU’s position in it. In continuation hereof, 
we examine to what extent the hegemonic mechanism can be seen in the EPA between 
EU and the EAC. Then we examine to what extend EU lead firms have an interest in 
the EPA. This concludes our analysis of the EPA from EU’s perspective. In the second 
part of the analysis, we change this perspective and look closer at Kenya’s interests in 
the EPA. Here Kenya functions as a proxy for the wider EAC. We first explore the Ken-
yan government’s attitude to the EPA, thereafter the associations representing the 
main firms exporting to EU. Then we take into account two of the most important 
value chains for Kenyan export to EU, considering the formal regulations of the EPA. 
Lastly, we take a broader look at how the EPA might affect Kenya, the country’s econ-
omy and its export.  
2.3 Methods 
Approaching the field of GPE from a heterodoxy perspective have to some degree in-
fluenced the concrete methods we use to gather our data and conduct the analysis; as 
Palan argues:  
[…] heterodoxy theories are founded on the assumptions that the ‘units’ of the so-
cial world – be they individuals, states or any other organisation – are driven by 
diverse, often conflicting, sets of motivations and rationales (Palan, 2012:6).  
The social world is often approached inductively, rather than deductive, with a focus 
that is ‘descriptive (often historical), open-ended, empirical and continuous’ (Palan, 
2012:6). Producing a paper such as this the working process automatically tend to be 
inductive. Choosing a theoretical approach does provide limits and gives us a certain 
take on how to understand the world, but this does not provided us with a fixed con-
clusion in advanced. The process has been an interaction between our theoretical ap-
proach, the theories, and our fieldwork and empirical data, where our use of the former 
two have been adjusted to our findings along the way. 
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Many heterodox scholars tend to view the social sciences as a field where the phenom-
ena or cases has to be researched through the people or actor’s conception of what is 
actually going on (Redding, 2005:128). Our research- and working questions follows 
this approach by asking question focused on improving our understanding of the EU’s 
and Kenya’s interest in the EPA agreement. Rather than a quantitative study, in which 
we try to crunch the export and import numbers of the regions, we have used a quali-
tative research method in order to understand leading actors, who were part of the 
negotiations or who are affected by the agreement. Their conceptions of why they 
agreed on the EPA are more relevant to the actual conclusion of the agreement, that 
what we can deduct from looking at the projected or actual cost and gains of the rele-
vant trade areas covered by the EPA. 
2.3.1 Fieldwork, interviews and empirical data 
As the EAC is less tightly knitted together as a political entity compared to EU, finding 
official policies, economic analyses, etc. for it as a whole have been an issue. Instead, 
it was necessary to examine the EAC countries individually. As mentioned in Chapter 
1, we did not have the time to do a comprehensive study of all five countries and the 
relationship between them regarding the EPA. Instead, we have chosen to focus on one 
country in particular. Throughout this paper, we are therefore concentrating our effort 
on Kenya, with the hope of gaining a greater understanding of the EAC through them. 
As part of our preparation, we conducted a 16 days fieldwork in Nairobi in January to 
gain insights into some of the more inaccessible aspects of the EAC and the EPA, in-
cluding the negotiation process and unpublished local viewpoints.  
During the fieldwork, we conducted three background interviews. One with the Danish 
Foreign Service and with two personal acquaintances who currently work in the re-
gion. These three interviews are considered ‘background interviews’ because we do not 
use these directly in this paper, but they did provide us with insights into both the 
country, its trade relations and to build a local network. During our time in Kenya we 
took an approach of participating observation as described by Warming (2010). In 
which “the dialog and the conversation are essential to understanding of the world” 
(Warming, 2010:334). The background interviews have in that sense helped us to gain 
a greater understanding of the trade relationship in Kenya, the impacts these agree-
ments have locally, and to narrow down our focus regarding the EPA’s implications 
and effects on Kenya. 
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In addition to the two background interviews, we conducted two full research inter-
views, which are a core part of our empirical data. The interviews were with the Trade 
& Communication Counsellor at the EU Delegation in Nairobi and with the Executive 
Office of Business Competitiveness Service of Kenya Association of Manufacturers 
(KAM)8. Both were highly qualified to discuss the EPA with us, as the Trade Counsellor 
had been the EU’s local responsible for the EPA negotiations (lead negotiations were 
flown in from Brussels) and KAM’s executive officer had been part of a working group 
coordinating the EPA efforts between the different associations of Kenyan producers. 
Lastly, we also did an interview with a fresh produce export company. This latter in-
terview was done to get some insights from a company affected by EU’s withdrawal of 
the MAR benefits. For this interview the company’s employees asked us not to tape the 
interview or use their or the company’s names as part of this paper. We have respected 
these wishes and when referencing to the information we gain through this interview 
we simply refer to our ‘field notes, 2015’. 
All three interviews were conducted as semi-structured elite interviews, due to the 
complexity of the topic (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009:167) and to some extent difficulties 
in achieving knowledge about the specific negotiation between EU and the EAC by 
other means. The main strength of doing semi-structured interviews is to make the 
best use of the interviewee’s knowledge in order to let the conversation evolve natu-
rally, while at the same time keep a sense of direction so the interview do not stray off 
the theme (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009:79-98 & 186p). 
During our fieldwork, it became clear that very few people in the Kenyan government 
had comprehensive knowledge regarding the EPA. Thus, the fieldwork experienced 
some difficulties in the meeting with the African bureaucracy. Government offices 
were reluctant to answer emails and return phone calls – most were ignored. While 
this could have been lack of interest in our project or the fact that students are not 
normally allowed to conduct interview with high-ranking officials are difficult to say. 
The book Fieldwork in the Global South suggest that some privileged local individual 
such as local officials and politicians can “shield themselves from scrutiny, and resist 
the intrusiveness of social research” (Perera-Mubarak, 2014:209). It is also noted that 
it can be difficult to access local officials and politicians without no prior personal links 
                                                             
8 These two interviews are referenced in the text as de Vroey, 2015 and KAM, 2015 for the EU Delega-
tion and Kenya Association of Manufacturers respectively. The full transcriptions of both interviews 
can be retrieved by contacting the authors via asgu@ruc.dk or kabjpe@ruc.dk.  
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to the persons in question. The solution is described, as ‘personal sponsorship’ where 
you are introduced to an official by an individual know to them (Perera-Mubarak, 
2014:206-209). Officials we could have conducted the interview with would refer us 
to persons in higher positions internally in the ministerial hierarchy when visiting in 
person, either out of curtesy to give us the best information available, or because they 
were not allowed or did not want to share possible sensitive information. Several 
times, did we wait for a meeting with the Director of International Trade, the respon-
sible diplomat for the EPA within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but due to meetings 
with ambassadors and such our interview did not occurred or was postponed. In hind-
sight we did not have the necessary time to gain access to all those interviewees we 
would have liked due to the time consuming nature of both formal and informal pro-
cedures of introduction. 
Another – more surprising – difficulty we have encountered has been the acquisition 
of the EPA between EU and the EAC. During the research, it has not been possible to 
get a copy of the final agreement. Quite a lot of effort have been put into getting it, 
including enquiring with the Foreign Ministry of Denmark and their representation in 
Brussels, but neither institutions actually had the EPA. Instead, the first-hand 
knowledge specific to the EPA we have – besides the interview with the EU-delegation 
in Nairobi – is a factsheet circulated by the European Commission's Directorate Gen-
eral for Trade on the day the agreement was initialled (DG Trade, 2014). To accommo-
date this have we shifted our focus away from the actual provisions of the EPA to how 
the agreement are perceived by both actors within EU and the EAC as well as academ-
ics who have been working with the agreement for longer than we have. 
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Chapter 3 
History Matters – EU-EAC Relations 
 
 
The EPA negotiated between EU and the five EAC members builds on a past of eco-
nomic agreements, political cooperation and historical exploitation. All have influ-
enced today’s global order and relations between the countries of Europe and East Af-
rica, as well as the EPA. Thus are the following chapter going to provide a quick run-
through of the historical connection between Europe and East Africa; an overview over 
East Africa’s colonial trade and economic relations with Europe; the European Com-
munity’s initial trade policies towards its former colonies; and international agree-
ments between EU and the ACP countries, such as Lomé to Cotonou. 
These historical and contemporary factors have all played a part in shaping the politi-
cal, economic and cultural relations between EU and the EAC. In that way both history 
and geography does matter as these relations have framed the background and prem-
ises for the negotiations and finalisation of the EPA. Providing an understanding of 
these relations are in that way essential to our analysis and for understanding both 
EU’s and the EAC’s interests in the EPA. 
3.1 East African trade prior to the Cotonou 
Coastal East Africa, including present Kenya, Tanzania and Somalia, can to some de-
gree be said to have been dominated by foreign powers for more than twelve hundred 
years. Beginning with Arab and Persian slavers, traders and immigrants from as early 
as the 8th century. Especially the trade influence from the Arabs was significant. The 
first Europeans to set up trade posts in the region were the Portuguese in the 16th cen-
tury. The Portuguese Empire never settled comprehensively and was eventually 
pushed out by the Sultans of Oman, who by the 1830’s controlled the entire coast. The 
period around 1800 saw growth of the slave export from East Africa, mainly due to 
French demands in Mauritius and Bourbon. In 1833, the Americans were the first 
Westerners to sign a trade agreement with the Sultans - followed by the British and 
French in 1839 and 1844, respectively. The inland Africans arrived at the coast before 
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the Sultanates began to move inland, and it was in that sense the inland population 
that initiated trade between the interior and the coast (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
2015). 
During the last half of the 19th century European presence in East Africa were mainly 
explores and Christian missionaries concerned by African slave trade. They were fol-
lowed by philanthropic, commercial and imperialist ventures. Eventually the Berlin 
Conference laid out the rules of imperialistic conquest – and hence marked the begin-
ning of the ‘scramble for Africa’ – in 1885 (Chamberlain, 2014; 53). A year later, in 
1886, Britain and Germany had carved most of Eastern Africa up between them; with 
present Kenya – and from 1890 most of modern Uganda – placed under British influ-
ence and mainland Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi under German influence, though 
the German areas was lost to Britain during World War I (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
2015). 
A general lack of mining possibilities in the Britain’s African territories – with Rwanda 
and Rhodesia as notable exceptions – meant that the East African protectorate focused 
on agricultural. The colonial adventures into agriculture can be divided onto three dif-
ferent types. Firstly, concessions held, typically, by international firms with managed 
by a small number of expatriates who then relied on African labour. Secondly, estate-
agriculture run by white settlers who also used African labour, but who saw themselves 
as permanent owner entrepreneurs – typical for the white farmers of Kenya. Lastly, 
there was an indirect involvement in agriculture by firms, which issued seed to African 
farmers, and then bought and processed the crop (Hopkins 1976:33-34 & 36).  
General trade between Colonial East Africa and Europe was in the interwar period 
dominated by large state-chartered – or at least state-associated – mercantile firms, 
such as The Uganda Company and the Imperial British East Africa Company. These 
were largely commercial failures and were replaced by European commercial firms 
concentrating on “shipping agency and the import of cotton goods, tea and sisal pro-
duction, livestock management and agricultural processing machinery” (Hopkins, 
1976:42). 
After World War II Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika9 established a common market. 
This had already been initiated in 1922 with common external tariff it was largely a 
                                                             
9 Modern day Tanzania, excluding an independent Zanzibar. 
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result of common policies rather than fixed treaties. The common market further re-
moving internal tariff barriers; free movement of capital and labour; and in reality es-
tablishing fixed import duties, and excise and income tax across the three territories, 
as businesses would move between countries if one had more favourable taxes (Low & 
Smith, 1976:331-32). During the 1950’s Tanganyika and Uganda felt increasingly dis-
satisfied with the common market and the other institutions linking them to Kenya, at 
this point this included a common currency. Their biggest concern of dissatisfaction 
was unequal development, especially unequal industrial development, as businesses 
as manufacturing industries preferred to settle in Kenya. Further Kenya gained the 
most from the inter-territorial trade. Kenya’s export of locally produced goods rose 
from five to 12 per cent of GDP between 1951 and 1965, while Uganda’s fell from 10 to 
six per cent of GDP and Tanganyika’s only exceeded two per cent in a single year dur-
ing the same period. Throughout the post-war years, Uganda and Tanganyika had for-
eign trade surpluses, but deficits regarding their trade with Kenya. While Kenya did 
have some clear advantages – a more rapid rate of industrialisation and the commer-
cial capita of East Africa – Low & Smith (1976:342) states that the allegedly adverse 
inplications of the common market were exaggerated.  
3.1.1 Post-colonial trade  
The EAC countries all gained their independence in the early 1960’s: Tanzania in ‘61 
from Britain, Rwanda and Burundi in ‘62 from both Belgium, and Uganda and Kenya 
from Britain in ‘62 and ‘63, respectively. However, the colonial history and it’s exploi-
tation of Easter Africa have continued to affect the collaboration between Europe and 
the East African countries. In 1976, William Zartman wrote that:  
The European presence has, however, shifted from overt and direct to more subtle 
forms. While military occupation and sovereign control over African territories 
have all but been eliminated, political influence, economic preponderance, and 
cultural conditioning remain. Britain and France, and with them the rest of the 
European Community, maintain a relatively high level of aid and investment, trade 
dominance, and a sizable flow of teachers, businessmen, statesmen, tourists and 
technical assistants (Zartman, 1976:327). 
Zartman’s quote reflects well the complaint of many African leaders from the 80’s, 
who, through organisations such as Organization of African Unity (now the African 
Union) and the Economic Commission of Africa “blamed the continent’s underdevel-
opment on external factors, including foreign capital arising out of the world capi-
talist system and the massive capital and resource haemorrhage from the continent” 
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(Owusu, 2003:1655). Against this argument stood the World Bank, IMF and ‘other 
neoliberals’ who insisted that the internal African political and economic arrange-
ments slowed the development of the continent. By 1984, was the African continent, 
riddled with reports of famine, natural disasters and starvation, deteriorating fast. At 
the same time, the World Bank and other international financial institutions made a 
“series of market-oriented policies with macroeconomic stability at their core, collec-
tively known as SAP’s” (Owusu, 2003:1657) prerequisites for receiving loan and aid. 
The SAP’s promoted economic growth through increases in production, mostly in the 
export sectors and downplayed concerns over income distribution. With deterring 
economies and desperate for funds many African leaders chose the SAP conditions 
over their own homemade initiatives. By the late 80’s the SAP’s had become the main 
instrument of development planning in Africa. African leaders thus ended up surren-
dering their ‘right to design and implement policies for their countries’ (Owusu, 
2003:1655-1660). 
In 1980 Kenya was one of the first countries to conclude a ‘Structural Adjustment 
Loan’ with the World Bank. As a result, Kenya abandoned its import-substitution pol-
icies and replaced it with an open and liberalised trade regime with decreased tariffs, 
loosened import control and export-promoting policies. Two years later the Kenyan 
government looked to IMF for funding and once more had to promise trade liberalisa-
tions. Initially the government’s promises of liberalisations was exactly that, promises, 
but during the last half of the 80’s Kenya came under pressure from its donors and 
began liberalisations. By the late 90’s Kenya “had a relatively low and harmonized 
tariff structure and numerous policies aimed at supporting the growth of exports” 
(Gertz, 2009:2-4). Tanzania pursued the same funds during the 1980’s and as a result, 
they too implemented policies of ‘stabilisation and liberalisation’ and according to 
Adam et al. (1996:534) Tanzania’s reforms were ‘especially rapid’ and ‘more extensive’ 
than the reforms implemented in Kenya.  
The UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) confirms this history of liberalisa-
tion dating back to the 80’s, not only for Kenya and Tanzania, but according UNECA’s 
Sub-Regional Office for Eastern Africa for the whole of East Africa10: 
Trade liberalisation in Eastern Africa took place both in multilateral WTO/GATT 
processes and through regional processes (regional trade agreements). The former 
                                                             
10 The UNECA’s Sub-Regional Office for Eastern Africa covers not only the EAC, but also Somalia, Ethi-
opia, Eritrea, Djibouti South Sudan, Madagascar and the eastern parts of the DRC. 
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were partly as the result of pressure from international organizations such as the 
World Bank and the IMF to liberalise their economies […]. As a result Eastern Af-
rican countries liberalized foreign trade (both at multilateral and regional levels), 
capital markets and privatized national industries. Trade liberalisation has there-
fore been an important driver of economic integration and export growth in East-
ern Africa. 
As a development strategy, trade liberalisation was expected to lead to increased 
exports, increased productivity and structural change (UNECA, 2013:1). 
 
The economic integration in Eastern Africa is something that dates back to the 1960’s 
were the first efforts to establish an East African Community11 failed.  The current EAC 
was founded in 1993 in Arusha, Tanzania, but not launched until 2000. Rwanda and 
Burundi was included in 2007. The ‘new’ EAC was founded: 
to strengthen their economic, social, cultural, political, technological and other ties 
for their fast balanced and sustainable development by the establishment of an 
East African Community, with an East African Customs Union and a Common 
Market as transitional stages to and integral parts thereof, subsequently a Mone-
tary Union and ultimately a Political Federation; (EAC, 2008:3) 
The EAC fulfilled part of the preamble above in 2010 by consolidated the economic 
integration by establishing a custom union and a common market (EAC, 2015). 
3.2 EU Policies and International Agreements 
Since January 1 1970, EU has had a common trade policy instigated by the Treaty of 
Rome from 1957, which gave the Council mandate to negotiate and ratify agreements 
on the behalf of the member states (EU-Lex, 2015). This gave the European Economic 
Community (EEC) a better position to engage as an entity on questions regarding 
trade, in the International Trade Organisation and other international fora. 
Also part of the Treaty of Rome was the creation of formalised collaboration with for-
mer colonies in African as ‘association of the overseas countries and territories’. It was 
EEC’s first attempts to engage with a collaboration of overseas countries and territo-
ries in questions of development aid and trade regimes. The purpose is made clear in 
the treaty’s article 131: “The purpose of association shall be to promote the economic 
and social development of the countries and territories and to establish close eco-
nomic relations between them and The Community as a whole” (EU, 1957:46). The 
quote’s focus is on the continually collaboration with the former colonies. However, as 
                                                             
11 This first community only included Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. 
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part four of the treaty elaborates on, the focus is especially on the possibility for trade 
through a reduction – and later the abolishment – of the duty barriers between the 
ECC and the overseas countries and territories. These goals were accompanied by the 
creation of the European Development Fond (EDF) (EU, 1957:46-47). 
From the Treaty of Rome until today, there have been a number of international agree-
ments and conventions between EU and the former colonies of Africa, the Caribbean 
and the Pacific. The first two were Yaoundé conventions (1963-1969 and 1969-1975). 
The conventions were outlines for the EDF and framed premises of both development 
and trade from the Treaty of Rome. The conventions – especially the second conven-
tion – focused on the newly independent West African states and other former French 
colonies, and allocated many funds through the EDF (EU Cameroon, 2015).  
Regarding trade, the Yaoundé Conventions claim to free trade between the EEC and 
the eighteen associated African states in questions. However, “Yaoundé did not pro-
vide for free trade among Associated states, although it did not preclude it. The ex-
ceptions limited the extent of free trade to particular commodities” (Gruhn, 
1976:246). Many of the associated states did already have agreements about trade 
preferences, what the conventions did was establishing a principle that the associated 
states could no longer discriminate against or between EEC members. Gruhn argues 
that both Conventions were designed by the EEC and that they were presented to Af-
rican leaders on an ‘acceptance or rejection basis’. The relationship to Europe and its 
markets was essential to the associated countries’ economic survival in the post-inde-
pendence years, and the African leaders did not have the economic or political leverage 
to object over the provisions of the Yaoundé Conventions The two conventions were 
the first trade and development agreements between the European Community and 
the African states. In that sense, they have defined all following agreements (Gruhn, 
1976:243-248). 
3.2.1 The Lomé Conventions 
In 1975, the EU agreed upon the first of four Lomé Conventions with, at that time, the 
46 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. A number that had risen to 70 once 
the fourth convention was signed. The first convention was significant as it added the 
20 Commonwealth countries from Africa to the Yaoundé’s 18 and that it included the 
colonies from the Caribbean and the Pacific. On the European side, it expanded the 
original six EEC members to nine with the inclusion of the United Kingdom, Ireland 
29 
 
and Denmark. The inclusion of the new countries also lead to the understanding of the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries as one common group of countries 
(EU, 2004).  
With the first Lomé Convention, some changes in the structure of the cooperation be-
tween the EEC and the ACP countries were incorporated. The two main provisions of 
the Lomé Convention regarding trade had the purpose to negate the unintended re-
striction on trade barriers from the Yaoundé Conventions. These were:  
1. Free access without reciprocity to the European market for goods exported from 
the ACP. 
2. A stabilization fund to compensate the ACP in the event of reductions in the 
receipts from the export of their principal basic products (Gruhn 1976:248). 
 
Among others were financial aid from the EDF and the European Investment Bank 
(EIB), as well as industrial and technology cooperation to create better opportunities 
for the ACP state’s competition. In continuation, there were agreements on purchases 
of specific products (e.g. sugar) for a minimum price that equalled the European price 
(Gruhn, 1976:248-249). The Lomé negotiations were remarkable in one certain aspect. 
The energy crisis of the 70’s had given the OPEC countries and a number of LCD’s 
some economic leverage over the industrialised north. “The industrial states’ concern 
with resources has brought home their dependence on some Less Developed Coun-
tries, in order to sustain their own industrial and economic well-being” (Gruhn, 
1976:260). The convention even received praise from Johan Galtung, who pointed to 
the fact that the Lomé gave substantial gains in economic terms to the ACP countries 
over the previous trade agreements. However, the convention did not change to overall 
asymmetric relationship between the EC, who determined to terms of the agreement 
and the ACP countries who signed (Galtung, 1976:13-15; Gruhn, 1976:259). 
During the renegotiating of the second, third and fourth Lomé Conventions, the con-
ventions became more focused on regional integration and collaboration. During the 
years of the Lomé Conventions, many countries entered the ACP and the funding 
climbed from 3,450 million ECU12 in the first convention to 12,000 million in the 
fourth (Nilsson, 2002; EC, 2005).  
Lomé IV was signed in 1989, but according to Cosgrove (1994) the previously conven-
tions had failed to deliver on ACP trade. In 1985 had ACP export accounted for 3.4 per 
                                                             
12 European Currency Unit (₠ or ECU). 
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cent of the EU’s total import – by 1992 that number was down to 1.5 per cent (Cos-
grove, 1994:223). Cosgrove (1994:249) even finished with an advised to the ACP 
states: “Self-help, not E.C. help, is the key to their future success”. With the new post-
Cold War world order, Cosgrove might have been more correct than she knew: as the 
Cotonou Agreement should be a radical re-evaluation of the EU-ACP relations (For-
wood, 2001:432; Hurt, 2003:174). 
3.2.2 Cotonou Agreement and the EPA’s 
The aim of the Cotonou Agreement is to establish a comprehensive partnership be-
tween EU and the ACP countries regarding development, political, economic, and 
trade cooperation (EC, 2015b).   
The Cotonou Agreement was hailed for letting non-reciprocal trade preferences give 
way for regional free trade agreements and compared to the Lomé Conventions this 
was definitely one of the big changes (Forwood, 2001:424). Depending on the author, 
this is either evidence of the necessity of making a trade agreement that was compati-
ble with WTO rules (Nilsson, 2002:439) or a conscious neoliberal strategy persuaded 
by the EU to promote self-interests (Hurt, 2003:174). 
From EU’s point of view had the non-reciprocal policies of the Lomé Conventions not 
worked. As noted above exports and markets shares had declined for the ACP coun-
tries. Cotonou was negotiated between 1997 and 2000, and it was ratified in 2003 with 
a strong emphasis on partnership that implies responsibility and mutual commit-
ments (EU, 2004).  
The new Agreement also focuses on the sustainable economic development of ACP 
States and their smooth and gradual integration into the global economy through 
a strategy combining trade, investments, private-sector development, financial co-
operation and regional integration. Development strategies focus on poverty re-
duction as central objective. (EU, 2004)  
As with both the Yaoundé and Lomé conventions, the ACP’s role in the negotiations 
was limited to reactions on EU’s proposal. While the ACP succeeded in ‘toning down’ 
the EU’s proposal on migration and good governance the ACP failed to make any of 
their own proposals part of the negotiation (Forwood, 2001:436). The history of asym-
metry between the EU and the ACP thus continued. 
During the last 15 years, the Cotonou Agreement has been reviewed twice. Most re-
cently in 2010, where new provisions regarding trade arrangements were added. These 
provisions were included to ensure greater liberalisation of trade and to enforce new 
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systems of governance for ACP countries to conclude the liberalisation without nega-
tive effects (EC, 2010a:47-52). 
The EPA’s were introduced by the Cotonou Agreement as a part of a new trading ar-
rangement between the ACP and EU. The EPA’s are one of the main instruments on 
the economic and trade parts of the Cotonou Agreement:  
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are supposed to be asymmetrical trade 
agreements that foster sustainable economic and social development in the ACP 
and promote their smooth and gradual integration into the world economy (Meyn, 
2008:515). 
Even though the Cotonou Agreement was ratified in 2003, the Lomé trade regime ex-
pired by the end of 2007, as the ACP countries and EU therefore had to the December 
31 2007 to negotiate the EPA’s. As something new, the negotiations were done between 
each of the seven ACP regions and EU, instead of with all the ACP countries as one 
bloc. It is also stated in the Cotonou Agreement that these agreements should be com-
patible with the WTO rules on trade (EU-Lex, 2000).  
Due to ACP criticism of the process did the negotiations drag on and in the later stages 
of the negotiations, with the December 2007 deadline looming, it was decided to post-
pone the comprehensive EPA and instead agree on a number of interim EPA’s. The 
main ACP criticism included more time to set up internal institutions to facilitate the 
initiatives, and scepticism due to EU pressure and unequal benefits of the agreement. 
With the exception of the CARIFORUM, the Caribbean region, who manage to finalise 
a comprehensive EPA in 2007, all other regions including the EAC settled for interim 
agreements, meaning that the negotiations had to be continued at a later point in time 
(Meyn, 2008; EC, 2015c; de Vroey, 2015).  
The main objectives of the interim EPA between EU and the EAC was to create full 
duty-free and quote-free market access for the EAC countries into the European Mar-
ket; progressive and gradual liberalisation of the EAC markets; WTO compliance; and 
secure improvement and preservation of EAC markets to ensure that they would be 
better off than prior to the agreement (DG Trade, 2009; EC, 2010b). The interim EPA 
was initialled by the EAC, but the countries never signed nor ratified the agreement. 
Nevertheless, the EAC countries got the benefits of the agreement based on the under-
standing that they would eventually agree on a comprehensive EPA (EC, 2013a; de 
Vroey, 2015).  
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This concludes the outline of the history that has shaped the foundation for where the 
EU-EAC EPA is today. The negotiations of the comprehensive EPA have built upon the 
previous both historical conditions and agreements, as well as both competed and 
failed negotiations such as the interim EPA. The following chapters consisting our 
analyses will build upon this historical foundation of the trade relationship between 
EU and the EAC. 
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Chapter 4  
EU Hegemony 
 
 
This chapter consists of the first part of this paper’s analysis. It sets out to answer the 
first of our working question: How can we understand the EPA as part of a global 
hegemonic order and how is such an order organized in regard of production and 
trade?  
The chapter first shows how a neoliberal hegemony is present in the contemporary 
global economy, before examining EU’s role in this hegemony. We argue that EU – its 
leading politicians and administrators – together with leaders of European transna-
tional companies are part of a transnationalistic capitalist class leading the hegemony. 
Thereafter we turn our attention to the EPA and investigate how it functions as a spe-
cific feature of the neoliberal hegemony. This analysis argues that EU through the EPA 
directly exploits the EAC by spreading the hegemony’s neoliberal norms, politics and 
policies, but does so in a way that the EAC can – to paraphrase Cox (1996:136) – “find 
compatible with their interest”.  
4.1 The Neoliberal Hegemony 
Our first task is to identify the characteristics of the global economy in order to under-
stand the role and position of EU, the EAC and the EPA within this hegemonic order. 
Drawing on Robinson’s (2005:565) notion of the transnational capitalist class (TCC) 
as the prime actors of the global hegemony we are able to identify these characteristics. 
The TCC consists of various owners and managers TNC’s and financial institutions, 
bureaucratic managers who administer multilateral international organisations such 
as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, other transnational forums, and certain 
strong states. 
Since the mid-nineties, national corporate communities have increasingly joined into 
‘transnational interlocks’ strengthening the position of TNC’s owners and managers 
transnationally. These networks consists largely of Euro-North American corporations 
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who have for years been part of the TCC. The centres of these networks have shifted 
towards Europe in the past few years due to European integration. These interlocked 
networks form transnational policy boards, such as the Trilateral Commission and the 
WBCSD13 creating a social organisation of elite cooperation in favour of transnational 
neo-liberalism (Carroll, 2010:224-226). Regionally for Europe, the European Round 
Table of Industries (ERT) is “a forum [that] bringing together around 50 Chief Exec-
utives and Chairmen of major multinational companies of European parentage” 
(ERT, 2015).  
These organisations play a large part in organising the global elite, unifying them and 
promoting transnational cooperation between local capitalist classes. The TCC are able 
to promote replication of the global status quo and the hegemonic order – in part by 
working together with international organisations that are part of global governance, 
such as the WTO and IMF (Carroll, 2010:227-232). The private TNC’s have also been 
provided legitimisation to act in both local and transnational political spheres by the 
international organisations’ support of Western norms of private power, individualism 
and the ‘free’ market. Organisations such as the IMF, WTO, the Word Bank, multilat-
eral development banks as well as most governments have promoted what is essential 
neoliberal norms as universal (Thomas, 2001:167). This fits with Robinson’s (2005) 
claim that the bureaucrats and technicians who administer international organisations 
are part of the TCC. 
The TCC can thus be said to consist of transnational policy boards, transnational cor-
porations, and the international organisations that governs the global economy, who 
all are promoting neoliberal norms to favour the status quo, and the TCC’s own privi-
leged position. Neoliberal norms are here understood as both politics and policies. Ne-
oliberal politics are characterised by market-centric concepts of the role, authority, 
and constituencies of the state, while examples of neoliberal policies are privatisation, 
deregulation, liberalisation, depoliticisation and monetarism14 (Mudge, 2008:707). 
                                                             
13 World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
14 Monetarism is a macroeconomic school of thought that emphasizes (1) long-run monetary neutrality, 
(2) short-run monetary non-neutrality, (3) the distinction between real and nominal interest rates, and 
(4) the role of monetary aggregates in policy analysis. It is associated with the writings of Milton Fried-
man, Anna Schwartz, Karl Brunner, and Allan Meltzer. Some have - inappropriate - used the term to 
refer to doctrinal support of free-market positions more generally (McCallum, 2008). 
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Following this argument, the hegemonic order of the world economy is dominated by 
two important characteristics. Firstly, a TCC that includes, but is not limited to, TNC’s 
and international organisations such as the IMF, WTO and the World Bank, and sec-
ondly, a reproduction of worldwide neo-liberalism by the international institutions 
mentioned above. 
The IMF and the World Bank have certainly been criticised for their neoliberal poli-
cies. Former World Bank vice president and chief economic advisor, Joseph Stiglitz, 
has accused the IMF of being “hijacked by ‘market fundamentalists’ who pushed the 
organization in the direction of neoliberal orthodoxy” (Babb, 2003:4). Stiglitz have 
also criticised the World Bank for demanding neoliberal ‘structural adjustment poli-
cies’ in return for providing loans to countries that were in a desperate need of the 
bank’s help (cited in Massey et al., 2006:11). To use Stiglitz’ own words: 
The IMF and the World Bank became the new missionary institutions, through 
which these ideas [Reagan and Thatcher’s free market ideology] were pushed on 
the reluctant poor countries that often badly need their loans and grants (Stiglitz, 
2002:13). 
The WTO plays an important part in the neoliberal hegemony too. Liberalisation of 
capital markets are a condition to become a member of the WTO (as well as the IMF) 
and the ‘freedom of trade’ now incorporated in WTO agreements are critical for global 
neoliberalisation (Harvey, 2005:66; 72). The WTO functions as a platform for inter-
governmental meetings, experts congregate, expertise is employed, and decisions are 
made within a common understanding expressed in a specific, political-economic lan-
guage – this languish is centred on free trade, within an overall neoliberal conception 
of economic growth, based on the universalistic belief that everyone benefits from 
trade and growth (Peet, 2009:241).15 
4.1.1 EU as part of the Hegemony 
Having determined a number of actors as part of the neoliberal hegemonic, we can 
now turn our attention to EU’s position in the hegemony, but also EU’s relations to the 
TCC. We have already mentioned the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), 
                                                             
15 For a comprehensive exposition on IMF, the World Bank and WTO’s role and attributions to the ne-
oliberal hegemony see Richard Peet’s (2009) book Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World Bank and WTO 
and David Harvey’s (2005) A Brief History of Neoliberalism. 
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as a regionalised European part of the TCC. According to the ERT itself, the organisa-
tion and EU are very much co-operating. As the ERT’s former chairman, Wisse Decker, 
puts it: 
I would consider the Round Table to be more than a lobby group as it helps to 
shape policies. The Round Table’s relationship with Brussels is one of strong co-
operation. It is a dialogue which often begins at a very early stage in the develop-
ment of policies and directives (Quoted in van Apeldoorn, 2000:160). 
The current chairman, Helmut Maucher, admits that the ERT is partly a lobby organ-
isation, but for ‘the competitiveness of Europe’, not any individual sector. However, he 
does go on and argues that, as this is also a concern for the European public authori-
ties, the ERT is a ‘privileged partner’. More so, the ERT delegation meets with the Eu-
ropean Commission’s president about twice a year, and in addition to this, ERT mem-
bers have regularly meeting with various commissioners (van Apeldoorn, 2000:160-
164). Since the early 1990’s have the ERT, both in its social and labour policies, been 
explicitly neoliberal. Since then have the ERT’s main focus been ‘competitiveness’ in 
the sense that it means “survival of the fittest in the fully open environment of a global 
free market in which competitive performance is what the market measures it to be” 
(van Apeldoorn, 2000:174). 
In addition to regular meetings with members of the TCC EU is also part of the global 
hegemony in its own right. As mentioned in Chapter 2, is the G7 governments and 
leaders also considered a powerful part of the hegemony. With EU as an active member 
of the G7, permanently represented by the President of the European Council and the 
European Commission’s President EU forms an active and important part of the 
Group and the current hegemony.  
EU’s own dedication to the liberal project is clearly described in the Lisbon Treaty. In 
Article Two the Treaty promotes ‘free and fair trade’ and in Article 10a: 
The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work 
for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to:  
[…] 
 (e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including 
through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade (EU, 
2007:24). 
As shown in our last chapter, History Matters, this dedication has clearly shown 
throughout the EU’s negotiations with the ACP countries. Nunn & Price (2004:203-5) 
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argues that the relationship between EU and Africa (as a whole) have be formalised 
through the evolving Yaoundé, Lomé and Cotonou agreements. They further argue 
that EU – with its institutionalised links with Africa – has played a key role to comple-
ment the global shift to neoliberal accumulation. EU is thus very much a part of up-
holding the current neoliberal hegemony in the world. 
Summarising the argument pursued so far, the current global homogeny can be un-
derstood as consisting of a transnational capitalist class. The TCC is formed by, among 
others: a number of TNC leaders, many organised around transnational policy boards; 
the bureaucracies of leading organisations in global governance, such as the IMF, 
WTO and the World Bank; and the powerful governments of the G7 countries, includ-
ing the EU, which in turn have strong ties to the rest of the TCC. For the entire TCC it 
can be argued that neoliberalism, in the form of market-centric privatisation, deregu-
lation, and liberalisation, is being promoted. Whether this is through conditionally 
loans from the IMF and World Bank, TNC lobbying, or trade agreements, such as the 
ones between EU and the ACP countries. Having established the neoliberal character-
istics of the global hegemony and that trade agreements can be used to promote and 
spread this neoliberal hegemony, we can now continue to look specifically at how the 
EPA between EU and the EAC is part of the hegemony. 
4.2 The EPA as part of the Hegemony 
Having established that EU can be understood as being part of a larger neoliberal he-
gemony; we continue to examine the role the EPA between EU and the EAC play in 
this regard. 
Looking into the details of the EPA, the two most important provisions are: 
1) Duty and quota-free access for all export from the EAC to EU.  
2) A gradual opening of the EAC markets to EU goods: 
82.6 per cent of the EAC market will be liberalised over the next 25 years16. 
The last 17.4 per cent that will not be liberalised are products within agri-
cultural, wines and spirits, chemicals, plastics, wood-based paper, textiles 
                                                             
16 25 years from the beginning of the negotiations, that is January 1 2008 meaning that 86.2 per cent 
of EAC’s market will have to be liberalised by 2032.  
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and clothing, footwear, ceramic products, glassware, articles of base 
metal, and vehicles (DG Trade, 2014). 
In addition to these two main points, the EPA does hold a number of technical issues17 
(DG Trade, 2014). We will go through the most relevant issues in order to examine if 
the EPA is promoting or spreading the politics and policies of EU and the rest of the 
TCC. 
To determine how the EPA is part of the neoliberal homogony we explore what Cox 
(1996) calls ‘the mechanisms of hegemony’. These mechanisms are the features of how 
international organisations, which are part of the hegemony – such as the EU – precise 
their hegemonic role.  
The first of these five mechanisms is an embodiment of rules that facilitate an expan-
sion of the hegemony. Given the point of the EPA as a free trade agreement, is to pro-
vide “duty free quota free market access for substantially all trade in goods based on 
the principle of reciprocity” (Ong’wen, 2014, original emphasis) the agreement does 
much to expand the liberalisation and deregulation to the EAC. Prior to the EPA the 
trade chapters of the Cotonou and Lomé agreements granted the EAC free export to 
EU without any further coordination and/or cooperation (de Vroey, 2015). According 
to the Southern & Eastern African Trade, Information & Negotiation Institute 
(SEATINI), EU sees trade liberalisation as an end in itself, while the EAC sees trade as 
a mean to economic transformation and national development. 
With the concluded EPA, EU got the free market access that it wanted, due to ultima-
tums and deadlines. Contrarily Kenya had to ‘back-load’ their priorities (Ong’wen, 
2014). The interim EPA has also done a lot to push the neoliberal norms, even though 
the interim EPA only cover goods and the comprehensive EPA extents to cover ser-
vices, intellectual property rights, etc. Having already had duty-free and quota-free 
access to the EU markets since 2008 the mayor interest organisations in Kenya did a 
lot of work to make sure, that the government would sign the agreement, preferably 
before the deadline October 16. The Kenyan Manufactures Association (KAM) grouped 
                                                             
17 A limit to export taxes, safeguards and infant industry protection, a most favoured nation clause, 
non-execution clause and a chapter on rules of origin. 
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together with the associations of exporters for fresh produce, cut flowers and fisher-
ies18 and advocated heavily for the EPA being concluded. Their primarily concern was 
not what demands the EPA imposed on Kenya and the EAC, but to make sure that 
Kenyan exporters would not lose market shares that would follow a loss of the Market 
Access Regulation (MAR) regime (KAM, 2015). EU has thus been able to expand ne-
oliberalist norms, politics and polities through the EPA, not only by the actual agree-
ment, but also through the local private sectors. 
The second of Cox’ mechanism of hegemony is that the features themselves are a prod-
uct of the hegemony. As such both EU, as an international organisation, and the EPA 
as a feature itself are products of the neoliberal hegemony. As mentioned in Chapter 
3, the EPA is partly a result of the Cotonou Agreement, partly a result of the need of 
WTO compatibility. Whether the details of the agreement was purely a matter of WTO 
compatibility or EU using GATT and WTO rules to push its own agenda through via 
the EPA is still disputed, but in both scenarios, the EPA’s content is shaped by WTO 
rules. This is both the case for the amount of EAC export being liberalised (82.6 per 
cent) and the time frames of 10 and 25 years respectively (Nilsson, 2002; Hurt, 2003; 
Ong’wen, 2014; de Vroey, 2015).  
The third mechanism is an ideological legitimisation of the hegemonic norms at a na-
tional level. The EPA’s second clause of liberalised tariffs will mean a large revenue 
loss for the EAC countries’ national budgets. Some studies “estimate between 20-30 
per cent losses in government revenue resulting from reciprocal free trade with the 
EC” (CUTS, 2009) others put the number just below 20 per cent (World Bank, 2009; 
Ong’wen, 2014). The EU is aware of the revenue loss, but is not worried, as explained 
during our interview, because “the liberalisation by the EAC will be very progressive 
[…] it is over 20 years. And over 20 years they can adapt easily by increased volumes 
of trade” (de Vroey, 2015). KAM also acknowledge that the EPA liberalisation will re-
sult in an opening of the Kenyan market for European competition, something that 
will threaten e.g. Kenyan steel producers. However, whether Kenyan producers are 
able to withstand this competition is described as a local issue that has nothing to do 
with the EPA (KAM, 2015). The EPA is thus creating a situation locally where the ne-
                                                             
18 Kenya Association of Manufactures (KAM), Kenya Flower Council (KFC), Fresh Produce Exporters 
Association of Kenya (FPEAK), and Kenya Fish Processors & Exporters Association (AFIPEK). 
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oliberal norm of a market-centric role of authority (increased trade is to replace gov-
ernment tariffs) and increased competition are replacing state authority of the econ-
omy. 
The fourth hegemonic mechanism is the co-opting of local elites and individuals into 
the hegemonic order. While it could be argued that KAM and the other private sector 
associations have co-opted with EU to get the EPA concluded, we have not found any 
clear cases where the local elites or individuals have been ‘co-opted into the interna-
tional institution’ – i.e. EU – in order to improve the EPA. Co-opting would probably 
be more relevant looking at more multilateral relations such as negotiations with the 
IMF or memberships of the WTO. 
Finally, the last mechanism of hegemonic is that international organisations absorb 
counterhegemonic ideas. In the Kenyan EPA negotiations the protests from small-
scale farmers provides the best example. In 2011 the small-scale farmers’ association 
the Eastern and Southern Africa Small Scale Farmers’ Forum protested the EPA’s ef-
fect on small-scale farmers’ livelihood (ESAFF, 2011), protests confirmed by our KAM 
(2015) interview. After a court ruling in 2013 the Kenyan government was forced to 
consult the Kenya Small Scale Farmers Forum ‘and others’ about the EPA negotiations 
as well “establish and put in place mechanisms for involving stakeholders in the EPA 
negotiations” (KFC, 2013). Allegedly, this inclusion quelled the protests (KAM, 2015). 
However, it is doubtful that the Kenyan government was able to alter very much be-
cause of the inclusion of the small-scale farmers, as the EAC in general was not allowed 
to change much in the EPA itself (Ong’wen, 2014). Thus have the counterhegemonic 
ideas against liberalisation of the Kenyan market been swallowed by the hegemony, 
through an inclusion that ultimately did not alter the final outcome of the agreement. 
Notwithstanding the co-opting of local elites, the EPA can be understood as a part of 
EU’s features to exercise its position as part of the global hegemony spreading the he-
gemony’s neoliberal norms, politics and policies to peripheral countries. With the in-
terim EPA’s acting as a lasso, catching Kenya by providing tariff-free access to the EU 
markets, which the country and its industries wanted to keep. EU could therefore haul 
Kenya into initialling the comprehensive EPA, as it became a necessity even though it 
brought some unwanted consequences with it. Given the criticism of the EPA being 
skewed to the EU’s advantage and the hash way EU acted once the October 1 (2014) 
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deadline had been passed fits well to Cox’ idea of strong states and regions of the he-
gemony who exploits peripheral states and regions in an order compatible with their 
own interest. The EPA thus balances between Kenya’s consent to keep its access to EU 
markets and EU’s cohesive demands for liberalisation. 
4.3 EU Export 
While one reason for EU’s effort to liberalise the Kenyan markets have been to avoid 
WTO criticism as current trade agreements do not comply with the WTO-rules (Vroey, 
2015), another reason has been “promoting trade between the two groupings [EU and 
EAC]” (EC, 2013b).  
Surprisingly EU exporters to Kenya, and the EAC, have been quiet about the new op-
portunities to export duty and quota-free to five-sixths of Kenya and the EAC’s mar-
kets. Around 17 per cent of Kenya’s import is from EU; however, this amounts to less 
than one per cent of EU’s total export19 (DG Trade, 2015a). Instead, EU’s industries 
have concentrated their lobbying effort on trade agreements between EU and coun-
tries like South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam, Japan and United States (de Vroey, 2015). 
A ten-page rapport published in November 2014 by Business Europe on ‘improved 
access to worldwide markets’ spends just four lines on Africa as a trade and investment 
area: 
The EU should follow suit with the negotiations on the Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPA’s), [and] at the same time encouraging further regional integra-
tion among African countries through the elimination of tariff and non-tariff 
measures as a way to enhance trade and investment in the region (Business Eu-
rope, 2014:5). 
Neither is the EU delegation in Kenya overly optimistic about EU export adventures 
in Kenya, quoting hindrance such as high labour, production and transportation costs 
compared to local purchasing power; cheaper goods from China and India; and the 
high import duty that still exists on the last sixth of local markets (de Vroey, 2015).  
Besides the general liberalisation of the Kenyan markets, the EPA also includes a num-
ber of formal standards to products being exported to EU. These should work as an 
instrument to economic integration outside the EU market. The EPA pushing these 
                                                             
19 Exports of goods to Africa as a whole is just 9.3 per cent of EU’s entire export, with South Africa alone 
being the biggest market purchasing 1.4 per cent of EU’s export. 
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standards are WTO compliant, furthermore do EU have its Single Market where in-
dustry and market actors have agreed upon a number of voluntary standards (EU-Lex, 
2003; DG Trade, 2015a; Vroey, 2015; EC, 2015d). “International standardisation 
should be reinforces and Europe’s interests safeguarded within it; international 
standards should be uniformly applied except where this would be ineffective or in-
appropriate for the objects pursued” (EU-Lex, 2003:4). This shows that the industry 
and market, when they act as lead firms have conducted hands-off governance through 
standards other firms must meet. The little interest from EU exporters and the primary 
goal of conforming to WTO (non-reciprocal) rules and promoting free trade, indicate 
that SEATINI is correct in its claim that EU sees trade liberalisation as an end in itself 
and have not pushed the EPA through to access or promote a new market in East Af-
rica. 
4.4 Summery 
This chapter has analysed how we can understand the EPA as part of a global hegem-
ony and how such a hegemony is organized with regard of production and trade. We 
have showed that the current hegemony is one of neoliberal norms, politics and poli-
cies, promoted by a transnational capitalist class. The TCC is made up by international 
organisations of global governance such as WTO, the World Bank and IMF; leaders of 
transnational corporations organised in both global and regional policy boards; and 
the powerful Group of Seven in which EU is permanently represented by the presi-
dents of the European Council and the European Commission. 
The EPA can thus be understood as a feature of this hegemony, spreading the neolib-
eralism from the hegemonic centre to the peripheral countries and regions such as 
Kenya and the EAC. As a feature of the neoliberal hegemony, the EPA shows certain 
mechanisms that facilitates the spread of norms, politics and policies. These are 1) ex-
panding neoliberal principles of liberalisation of trade and freer markets to Kenya and 
the EAC, 2) a reproduction of the hegemony as the EPA is a product of neoliberal WTO 
rules and regulations, 3) a legalisation and spreading of the neoliberal ideology by lim-
iting control over national budgets in favour of market-centric authority of the local 
Kenyan and EAC economies, and 4) absorbing local anti-liberalisation protests into 
the local implementation of the EPA. 
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Finally, have we looked at the responses from EU exporters to the EPA, to see if there 
were any indications that the liberalisation of Kenyan and EAC markets was part of a 
strategy to expand EU’s export markets. Something that does not seem to be the case 
as EU exporters have shown little interest in the EPA with the EAC. 
The EPA is thus an instrument of EU’s hegemonic ambitions to spread neoliberal 
norms, politics and policies to the peripheral countries of the EAC, which the EU have 
certain influence over due to the historical connection between the two regions. 
  
44 
 
Chapter 5  
EPA at all Costs 
 
 
This chapter aims to answer our second working question: How can we understand 
Kenya’s incentive to sign the EPA? As mentioned in Chapter 2, we have methodologi-
cally prioritised looking more carefully at Kenya as an indicator for the wider EAC, as 
Kenya’s stakes surrounding the negotiations have been higher than for the rest of the 
EAC countries. 
As we have shown above, the EPA can be understood as a feature of the neoliberal 
hegemony. To answer the working question, we will analyse to what extent Kenya, as 
a part of the EAC, has voluntarily conformed to the ‘hegemonic trade order’ of EU 
through both the interim EPA and the comprehensive EPA. The analyses will examine 
in its first part of this chapter how it is affecting Kenyan policies, to get an understand-
ing of opinion different local actors had to the EPA. In continuation hereof, the analy-
sis will examine the GVC for Kenya’s flower industry and the fresh produce. Both areas 
are important for Kenya’s trade with EU, so they can show how the external regula-
tions of the EPA has affected the GVC’s as well as the Kenyan firms within them. The 
last part of the analysis will look into the possibilities for the local Kenyan exporters to 
gain a ‘positive result’ from the EPA, thus getting an indication whether the EPA can 
actually benefit Kenya and the EAC in the future. 
5.1 Consent and Cohesion 
After a couple of years impasse in the EPA negotiations between the EAC and EU, the 
parties returned to the negotiation table in early 2012. The Secretary General of the 
EAC at that time, Ambassador Dr. Richard Sezimbera, “reaffirmed that the EU Market 
was still one of the significant export destinations for the region’s agricultural prod-
ucts since it offers the option to access a high priced market that is considerably pro-
tected” (EAC, 2012). Furthermore, he indicated that these negotiations would be the 
first time the EAC negotiated as one bloc in comparison to previous negotiations (EAC, 
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2012). When the negotiations dragged on, passed the October 1 2014 deadline and 
were finally concluded on the 16th, the Foreign Affairs Cabinet Secretary of Kenya, 
Amina Mohamed, accepted the delay in the negotiations with an argument that it was 
needed to secure thousands of jobs in Kenya’s raw material industries. One of the cru-
cial points causing the negotiations to drag on was disagreement on the amount of 
taxation the EAC should be allowed to impose on unprocessed raw materials being 
exported out of the region. While this delay has saved job in industries processing raw 
material, the consequences for Kenyan exporters and suppliers were an immediate 
loss of both income and jobs due to EU import taxes (KTN Kenya, 2014; de Vroey, 
2015; Field notes, 2015). The Minister’s statement on the day of the initialling of the 
EPA indicates a willingness from the Kenyan government to accept the high costs for 
the producers most immediately effected by the late initialling due to the priority of 
other sectors. 
As analysed in the previous chapter, we see a neoliberal hegemonic relationship be-
tween EU and the EAC present in the EPA, a relationship that is also notable in the 
historical bounds in former agreements between EU and the ACP. There are tenden-
cies in the EAC statement from 2012, which supported continuous access to the EU 
markets, and in Kenya’s foreign and trade policies towards an acceptance of the 
ground foundations outlined by the interim EPA (Were et al., 2009; EAC, 2012; DG 
Trade 2014; MFA Kenya 2014). The focus of newly adopted20 Kenyan foreign policy 
includes considerations towards international networks of social and economic sys-
tems:  
While offering new economic opportunities especially in the fields of science, tech-
nology and communication, globalization has led to competition for capital flows, 
shrinking market access and economic marginalization of developing economies 
(MFA Kenya 2014:16).  
Also highlighted in the foreign policy is Kenya’s collaboration in the EAC as one of the 
key institutions for ‘the prosperity of Kenya’. 
Already in 2007 when Kenya was negotiating the interim EPA, the Kenyan government 
launched a policy paper containing a vision of Kenyan policies until 2030 named Vi-
sion 2030, which is heavily referred to in the foreign policy of 2014. In Vision 2030, 
Kenya acknowledges the importance of the neoliberal idea of export-driven economy:  
                                                             
20 As of November 2014. 
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From a demand side, the growing world population and economy means a widen-
ing of the potential market for Kenyan products beyond the traditional developed 
country markets. However, other global economic trends […] means that countries 
like Kenya are likely to face, greater competition in previously non-tradable service 
sectors, higher quality standards in export markets and higher import prices for 
their raw materials.  
Kenya’s external environment will be significantly influenced by the changing in-
ternational and regional trading arrangement. In particular, the multilateral trad-
ing arrangements under the WTO and the regional trading arrangement under the 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) […] Both the Common Market for East-
ern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC) will 
increasingly become important markets for Kenya’s exports, especially of manu-
factured goods. 
The liberalization of global trade that has taken place under the multilateral trad-
ing framework has been a major reason for the rapid expansion in world trade. […] 
Along with other ACP countries, Kenya will be entering a WTO compatible EPA 
with the European Union (EU). The timing of the tariff reductions are already 
largely agreed and imply that EU producers of raw materials, capital equipment 
and final manufactured goods will increasingly access the Kenyan market duty and 
quota free. This reality will place limits on the extent to which Kenya can pursue 
protectionist policies to promote industrial development and makes an export ori-
ented development strategy an imperative. (Kenya, 2007:5) 
Here Kenya accepts that international trade regimes that have effects on Kenya, which 
mean that they need to accept WTO rules and agree on a WTO compatible EPA. How-
ever, Kenya does still wish to keep control over the national budget (Kenya, 2007 & 
Kenya, 2012). This was likewise embedded in the EAC’s re-entering back into the ne-
gotiations in 2012 (EAC, 2012). In this contemplation between growing export mar-
kets and control over national budgets, it is possible to identify the consent-cohesion 
distinction of the hegemony’s influence over peripheral countries. Below we will try to 
go into Kenyan responses to the initialisation of the EPA. 
With the initialling of the EPA in 2014, the Kenyan government largely accepted to 
open up duty-free and quota-free access between EU and the EAC markets. The grad-
ually opening of Kenya only 82.6 per cent of Kenyan markets, and the provision that 
provide safeguards of reintroduced duties for infant industries and in cases of imports 
disturbing Kenya’s overall economy are important limits to the liberalisation (DG 
Trade, 2014). However, in the latter case of economy disturbing imports, it is neces-
sary to have the dispute settlement provisions in mind, as it will come in use if such 
duties are reinforced. The market liberalisation is providing a challenge to Kenya's in 
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Vision 2030 where it is presented that Kenya will have difficulties controlling their 
own national budget (Kenya 2007a:5).  
It is difficult to clearly establish the Kenyan opinion on the final EPA, due to the lack 
of statements from official sources after the initialling of the EPA. However, the Direc-
tor of Economics & External Trade Affairs from the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
who negotiated with the EAC and EU, does elaborated on the challenges of the EPA. 
He stresses some of the issues with EPA for the Kenyan side: from the uneven trade 
relationship regarding financial possibilities, disagreements within the EAC group, EU 
stringency about the rules of origin, and supplier constrains (i.e. standards) (KHRC, 
2015:9). 
The response from many of the bigger interest groups, such as Kenyan Flower Council 
(KFC) and Kenyan Association of Manufactures (KAM), as well as the exporter we vis-
ited, have been mixed. On one hand, they express satisfaction with the conclusion of 
the EPA negotiations; on the other hand, reluctance due to lost market shares due to 
the overdue deadline and extended competition (KC TV, 2014; KAM, 2015; Field 
notes, 2015). A more positive attitude was expressed by the EU Delegation as a coun-
ter-weight to the late signing of the agreement: 
Kenya was the only country on the African continent to have to pay import duties 
since the October 1. Of cause, they had a lot of pressure. On the other hand, the 
EPA is a continuity on duty-free access, but it is a lot more than market access it is 
a whole framework, which should and will provide legal certainty [and] that will 
provide or should improve the business climate into the region and also bring forth 
regional integration (de Vroey, 2015).  
De Vroey continues, arguing that the initiating agreement will be a clear benefit for 
Kenya compared to not support the EPA staying on the GSP. In a press release Decem-
ber 24 2014, the day Kenya regained access to the duty-free, quota-free export to EU 
ambassador further stated that KSh 200,000,000,00021 worth of Kenya exports sold 
in EU would remain competitive, and Europe will remain Kenya's largest export mar-
ket (EU Kenya, 2014). 
Overall, the completion of the EPA has not been a one-sided positive experience for 
Kenya. EU has put immense pressure on the country with threats of tariffs and duties, 
the agreement have brought new challenges to the Kenyan national budget with it as 
well as – according to the Kenyan Director of Economics & External Trade Affairs – 
                                                             
21 1.86 billion Euros as of May 2015. 
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an uneven trade relationship. The argumentation here is that the liberalisation of the 
Kenyan market has come about through both consent and cohesion. The Kenyan gov-
ernment and industries have expressed consent to the liberalisation through Vision 
2030 and the industries statements, and Kenya have historically been quick to accept 
Structural Adjustment Policies imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. However, the 
conclusion of the EPA has also carried cohesion with it in the form of heavy pressure 
by EU and new challenges to the national budget and government authority, which the 
Kenyan government would have preferred to be without. 
5.2 Industry Standards 
Having retained or kept, depending on whom one asks, the duty-free and quota-free 
export markets Kenyan producers again have good export opportunities to EU. This 
does not equal unlimited or unrestricted access. A big part of exporting goods from 
Kenya to EU have to do with what GVC theory describes as ‘standards’, i.e. making 
sure the exported goods meet certain quality levels set for the markets. These stand-
ards determine whether products can enter the market and potentially be sold or if the 
costs of improving a product to meet standards are too high. While the EPA largely 
offers access to the EU markets for Kenyan exporters, it also includes chapters on 
standards such as rules of origin (RoO) and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) meas-
urements (DG Trade, 2014).  
The main challenge of the EPA for the industries was actually not the details of the 
agreement. Instead it was a worry about the agreement not being initialled in due time. 
As we have mentioned Chapter 1 and 3, the three months on the General Scheme of 
Preferences (GSP) regime, without the Market Access Regulation (MAR) provision, 
was costly in both lost market shares and low profit on the markets the exporters man-
aged to keep. Many of the standards being implemented formally through the EPA are 
overall standards that have already been in place as voluntary standards for cut flowers 
and fresh produce exporters in Kenya (Field notes, 2015; KAM, 2015; de Vroey, 2015). 
What the EPA did was largely to formalise already existing standards that was inter-
nally put in place within the value chains by EU’s lead firms.  
Instead, the EPA chapters on RoO and SPS measurements were put in place to pro-
mote intraregional harmonisation within the EAC (DG Trade, 2014). These standards, 
which are being outlined in the agreement comply with WTO rules and can be seen as 
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a set of formal standards formed by the ‘public institutions’ that have an effect on the 
trade between EU and the EAC. Regarding RoO, one of the objectives was to “Deepen-
ing EAC regional integration through cumulation across EAC as well with COMESA 
and SADC countries” (EAC, 2012). Kenyan exporters thus have the possibility to  
[...] accumulate with products coming from other regions and other countries, and 
assemble them here [in Kenya] and export duty-free to the European Union. [This] 
is also a reason to be optimistic in the sense that there will be a reinforced integra-
tion process (de Vroey, 2015).  
De Vroey is underlining how the new standards make it easier for companies in Kenya 
to import materials from elsewhere, assemble it and still export it the EU as a local 
product covered by the EPA. This interpretation is backed by KAM who agrees that the 
removal of this ‘technical issue’ give some new opportunities for Kenyan Exporters 
(KAM, 2015). It gives some parts of the Kenyan industries opportunities to intersec-
toral upgrade when it is possible to unify production and still be able to export duty 
and quota-free to the EU market. 
As for the SPS measurements, they have been in place for many years – something we 
will go further into once we reach the global value chains for Kenya’s fresh produce. 
The EPA’s regulatory formalisation of these standards are, as with the RoO mostly an 
intraregional harmonisation, which do not has a big impact for Kenya or its exporters 
other than the acceptance of an EU policy (KAM, 2015). 
Having discussed how the EPA influences Kenyan industries at a more general level, 
the following sections examine two of Kenya’s leading export sectors: fresh produce 
and cut flower. Both to determine how the standards are affecting the different GVC’s. 
Cut flower alone made up 12 per cent of Kenya’s entire export by value in 2013 (Har-
vard, 2015) and EU receives 95 per cent of Kenya’s horticultural export (KTN, 2014) 
Europe as a whole received 37.6 per cent of all of Kenya’s export (OEC, 2012). Both the 
fresh produce and cut flowers industries are thus relying heavily on EU markets. 
5.2.1 Fresh Produce and Cut Flowers  
The industries exporting fruit, vegetables, tea, coffee and other products to the EU 
markets have been some of Kenya’s biggest exporters. The industries’ positions in the 
global value chain between Kenya and EU were threatened back in the late 1990’s and 
early 2000’s as many of the suppliers had to implement voluntary standards set by 
European supermarkets in e.g. Britain:  
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[...] the leading firms in the Kenyan fresh produce industry have essentially sought 
to ‘ride the tail’ of British supermarkets, investing in products, internal systems, 
and supply chains to service the premium-quality end of the market, including the 
growing demand for salads and other semi-prepared vegetable products (World 
Bank, 2005:86).  
These demands to Kenyan fresh produce exporters have therefore existed for years. 
Thus have many firms ensured that their products complied with the SPS standards 
and other measurements in order to stay within their respective value chains. This re-
sulted in a clear growth in the export of e.g. vegetables to EU after these implementa-
tions (World Bank, 2005:81-90). The standards are primarily problematic for the local 
suppliers, who produce to the Kenyan fresh produce industry’s exporters, as “some of 
the producers were shying away from using the small farmers” (KAM, 2015) because 
they cannot control whether the smallest of their local suppliers conform to the neces-
sary standards (KAM, 2015). 
Kenyan cut flower industry has been undergoing a lot of attention from different schol-
ars. The industry and the export of cut flowers have been increasing rapidly during last 
decades in Kenya, and the country is one of the largest producers worldwide. The Ken-
yan farms function as suppliers for a number of lead firms in the industry. These dif-
ferent firms commonly import Kenyan cut flowers via flower auctions in the Nether-
lands or through bigger supermarket chains in Europe (Rissgaard, 2007; Riisgaard, 
2008; KHRC 2012; Zylberberg, 2013). The Kenyan suppliers to the EU market are also 
divided into different groups; the companies that export, whom are likely to have a 
number of big plantations, and the small-scale farmers, who are further down the 
value chain supplying the local exporters. In the studies done by Lone Rissgaard (2007 
& 2008) and Zylberberg (2013) many of the SPS standards formally implemented in 
the EPA have already been put in place by lead firms. These formal EPA standards do 
therefore not have little effect on the Kenyan industry exporting to the EU market as 
they have already met these standards when they were implemented as voluntary 
standards by the value chain’s lead firms. 
Focusing on these two value chains, for fresh produce and cut flower industries, they 
are both heavily buyer-driven with demands coming from the importers on EU’s mar-
ket. There are large numbers of lead firms on the markets and one of the main leading 
firms is Tesco from the UK. Tesco are pressing their standards quoting demands from 
the costumers on the UK market (Riisgaard, 2008; Zylberberg, 2013). Much of the 
governance of these chains is coming internally from the lead firms, via a ‘hands-off’ 
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approach. The lead firms in Europe and the buyer-driven nature of the chains does 
determine many the standards, but it is up to the Kenyan exporters and suppliers to 
secure that these standards are met. If not, the lead firms will find different suppliers. 
This effect of hands-off approach to standards therefore has a trickle-down effect that 
some of the Kenyan industries’ associations, such as the Fresh Produce Exporters As-
sociation of Kenya (FPEAK) and Kenya Flower Council (KFC) enforce locally on behalf 
of their members (Riisgaard, 2008:18). The fact that many of the standards included 
in the EPA have been in place in Kenya for many years, and have been promoted locally 
by the Kenyan interest groups, means that there have not been too many objections 
from the Kenyan industries regarding the formal standards of the EPA. 
The export industries four main interest organisations joint together in the process to 
get most influence. The interest organisations largely supported the Kenyan govern-
ment’s approach to the EPA negotiations, so their lobbying-effort was to “advocate the 
government for a speedy conclusion of the agreement” (KAM, 2015) to avoid the pe-
riod of paying tariffs for their exports. What dissatisfaction that arose came from the 
small-scale farmers (ESAFF, 2011; KAM, 2015), who are most vulnerable to the new 
competition by EU goods and have the most difficulties in complying with value chain 
standards (IEA, 2006:xi). As mentioned earlier small-scales farmers were largely left 
out by the government during the initial negotiations, meaning that they would not be 
able to discuss local efforts to secure their position in the value chains and their liveli-
hoods with the Kenyan government (ESAFF, 2011; KFC, 2013; KHRC, 2013). 
5.3 Future Trade and Exports  
Currently, the most pressing issue for Kenyan export industries following the EPA in-
itialling are retrieving the market shares, which were lost during the three month on 
the GSP regime (Field notes, 2015 & KAM, 2015). The fresh produce exporter we in-
terview was quite frank about the consequences and underlined that the lost market 
shares on the EU markets had been lost for good. Producers in Tanzania and West 
Africa had seized the opportunity to take over due to their stable and lower (i.e. tariff-
free) prices (Field notes, 2015). However, once the initial shock have passed one point 
made during our fieldwork was the possibilities the EPA provided for Kenyan firms 
and producers to upgrade (de Vroey, 2015). 
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The fresh produce exporter we talked with in Nairobi, explained that they had termi-
nated the contracts with a thousand small-scale farmers, who had suppliers them. 
They were now down to only 600 (Field notes, 2015). In general the three months off 
the MAR has generally affected the Kenya’s industries. As presented by the EU dele-
gation: 
another sector that had been more affected was of cause the flower industry. Be-
cause 70 per cent of the flower production here in Kenya are exported to the Eu-
ropean Union (de Vroey, 2015).  
The big effects on the Kenyan economy was also outlined by KAM: 
The main concern for us as private sector was that, this thing about Kenya not 
being a LDC. And that meant that Kenya would actually suffer most in the region 
and the statistics we have that 50 per cent of the EAC exports into EU actually 
comes from Kenya (KAM, 2015).  
This is one reason why the cut flower industry experienced a 10 per cent drop in sales 
compared to the estimations for 2014, and ended with ‘only’ 7 per cent growth. Vege-
tables were even worse off with a drop in exports on 18 per cent in 2014 compared to 
2013. How many jobs were lost due to the reduce export have not been calculated yet 
(Masinde, 2015; Tralac, 2014; Wokabi, 2014), but the loss of jobs was largely a result 
of a shortening of the value chain. As when: 
the value chain was shortened substantially as relationships often became bilateral 
arrangements between UK retailers and Kenyan exporters. It shifted from market 
governance to a more relational, explicit form of coordination whereby retailers in 
the highly concentrated and competitive supermarket sector ensured that suppli-
ers met food safety and quality standards (Zylberberg, 2013:8). 
Either these standards can serve as a promoter for opportunities for the producers or 
they can serve as barriers for entry. Due to the layoff of the thousand farmers, the fresh 
produce exporter changes strategy concentrating on the 600 farms they had left, which 
were mainly the mass-producing frame, with which they could still compete for new 
markets (Field notes, 2015). 
We can conclude that there is a willingness among the different associations to help 
their producers. For the fresh produce industry, for example, Fresh Produce Exporters 
Association of Kenya (FPEAK) has a main goal as to “update and implement Kenya 
Gap to recognized international standards” (FPEAK, 2015). There is an effort to make 
product upgrades through standards improvements of the produced products, to be 
able to export to the EU markets. This is not only the case with EPA standards, but was 
likewise a priority when the fresh produce industries co-opted SPS measures in the 
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90’s and 00’s. The same have been the tendencies in other industries such as the cut 
flowers.  
Thought the three months without MAR access was a setback for Kenyan exporters; 
their presence on the EU markets has been historically strong. Zilberberg (2013) notes 
that the bigger producers find it easier to transform or adjust production, than smaller 
producers do. The small-scale farmers did find it difficult to adjust to new standards 
back in the 90’s:  
In 1992, almost 75 per cent of the fresh fruits and vegetables produced in Kenya 
were sourced from smallholders. By 1998, that number had dropped to 18 per cent, 
a rapid decline that saw the rise of well-capitalized large plantations and commer-
cial farms (Zylberberg, 2013:9).  
It should be noticed that numbers presented by the World Bank in 2012 show that 
Kenya in the years 2000-2009 had very good competitiveness, regarding cut flowers 
and fresh produce. These numbers can act as a guideline on how secure Kenyan ex-
porters’ market shares and their chances when competing for new ones are (World 
Bank, 2012). However, this will probably not benefit small-scale farmers and other 
local suppliers in the buyer-driven chains. When demand plummets – as when Kenya 
lost MAR access – or then new standards are introduced, they are the first to be cut off 
by the bigger producers (Field notes, 2015).  
The three months without MAR access has been costly for Kenya’s exporters and es-
pecially the small-scale farmers and other local suppliers. However, the increased 
competition and the standards introduces by the EPA does not seem to worry the Ken-
yan exporters and their associations as they are accustomed to these standards and 
have the opportunities to find new markets due to their overall competitiveness. The 
future for the small-scale farmers and other local suppliers, however, does seem more 
uncertain as they depend standards they are able to comply with and on the larger 
exporters to purchase their products. 
5.4 Summery  
In this chapter, we have analysed the Kenyan reactions to the EPA, both from the gov-
ernment and major industrial associations; the use of standards, by lead firms of the 
global value chains important to Kenyan export, and by the EPA; and the effects the 
delayed initialisation of the EPA had on Kenyan exporters and small-scale farmers. 
This in order to understand Kenya’s incentive to sign the EPA. 
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As part of the negotiations of the interim EPA, the government of Kenya largely 
adopted a neoliberal approach to trade through Vision 2030, the new foreign policy 
program of 2014, and the Foreign Secretary’s statements. However, there are clear as-
pects of the policies that the government itself admits to be problematic: control of the 
national budget and measures to protect its economy as the two most striking men-
tions. In addition to this comes a loss of authority to the market within the Kenyan 
polity. That there was less than full support behind the EPA is shown by the fact that 
it was not possible to initial the EPA on the supposed deadline. Especially, provisions 
regarding the level of export taxes allowed, rules of origin and most favoured nations 
caused the prolonging of the negotiations. 
Kenya was affected by the EPA negotiations. Not so much because of the specific out-
come and the agreement’s provisions, as lead firms within the global value chains had 
already introduces high standards on important export areas such as cut flowers and 
fresh produce. The real effects was due to EU’s decision to remove Kenya’s duty-free 
and quota-free access to EU markets for three months. There was clear pressure from 
the interest groups in Kenya on the government to conclude the negotiations prior to 
the deadline to avoid losing income and market shares.   
From Europe, the lead firms demand implementation of high standards throughout 
the global value chains through internal governance of the chains. With these volun-
tary standards, some upgrading has already taken place for Kenyan exporters and the 
small-scale suppliers who could afford it. Compared to the standards included in the 
EPA is there little room for further improvement. One exception is the RoO provision, 
which will make it easier for Kenyan producers to import raw materials, then value-
add before, exporting the finished products to EU markets. In the horticulture sectors, 
the EPA will only marginally affect many exporters. Accustomed to the high standards 
and with a big production capacity, the EPA itself has not done much for their com-
petitiveness. What did matter was the loss of markets shares due to the delayed ini-
tialisation.  
The Kenyan government and its officials had already accepted the neoliberal paradigm 
of liberalised trade during the interim negotiations. Add to this that the export indus-
tries were already accustomed to high standards and the mayor exporters lobbied 
heavily not to lose their duty-free and quota-free position. Kenya could barely afford 
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to lose the access they had been granted by the interim EPA and previous trade agree-
ments as EU takes up 95 per cent of Kenya’s horticultural export and Europe 37.6 per 
cent of Kenya’s overall export, it would be virtually impossible for Kenya to turn down 
the comprehensive EPA. At the end of the day, Kenya had to agree on the EPA, almost 
at all costs – regardless whether the EPA turns out to be good or bad for the country 
and for the EAC. 
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Chapter 6  
Additional Perspectives  
 
 
Having finished the main analyses and answered our working questions, we would like 
to address a number of the perspectives that have presented themselves during our 
analysis and while working in field. These are issues not directly included in the re-
search, but of relevance for the paper’s conclusion. Three issues have come up: Firstly, 
Kenya’s possibility of reaching out to markets outside EU as an alternative to initialling 
the EPA. Secondly, an elaboration of the challenges for the small-scale farmers and 
whether a liberalised Kenyan market can compete globally. Thirdly, if the intra-re-
gional relations and rivalry between Kenya and primarily Tanzania could have influ-
ence the initialling of the EPA. 
6.1 Alternatives to the EPA 
Generally, emerging economies – in particularly India and China – have increased in-
vestment, trade and foreign aid in Kenya and the rest of the EAC (Juma, 2011).  This 
tendency might not be completely new, but it is important to bear in mind when con-
sidering the evolving trade arrangements between EU and Kenya, as it may have con-
tributed to EU’s rash negotiation tactic. As shown in the two analyses Kenya and the 
EAC were hard pressed to conclude the EPA negotiations by initialling the agreement. 
Especially the tariffs on exports to EU was a decisive factor due to the immediately loss 
of market shares, export revenues and local jobs. While the other EAC countries was 
not in a hurry to conclude the EPA negotiations, as due to the EBA regime, they would 
be affected once their economies grew out of the LDC-category. This would result in a 
paradox were economic development would hurt the economy. Therefore, the ques-
tion arises, whether or not there was an alternative for the EAC countries to accepting 
the EPA. Were the opportunities better elsewhere and was it possible to ignore the 
hegemony of the West? 
57 
 
China is becoming a more and more relevant trade partner globally and China’s po-
tential as a leading world economy are being lively discussed (Subramanian, 2011). 
This is also recognised by the EU delegation in Kenya by underlining the low cost of 
products imported by Kenya from China; products EU is not able to compete with, at 
least not on price (Vroey, 2015). However, this is largely regarding the EAC’s import, 
not export. The question would be whether the emerging middle classes of China and 
India would be able to pay what European consumers are paying for Kenyan goods – 
and whether Kenyan producers could compete with local producers on the markets of 
China and India. To give EAC producers a fighting change, some kind of trade agree-
ment with these countries would probably be necessary. Something that is unlike to 
happen, according to the EU delegation:  
[...] if you look at the advantages that the EPA is offering I mean basically it is the 
duty-free access to the European Union that is the advantages that no one else will 
be able to offer the continent. I mean assume that Kenya starts negotiating free trade 
agreement with India, China they will never have this 100 per cent duty-free access 
to the Indian market, in that sense the EPA even though it is a continuity of existing 
trading assisting that have been taking place before (Vroey, 2015).  
Looking at the numbers, Europe received 37.6 per cent of Kenya’s export, Africa as a 
whole purchases 37.7 per cent22, while China and India combined only account for 3.1 
per cent of the Kenyan export23 (OEC, 2012). Looking at the export numbers it is clear 
that the European markets are essential for Kenya and it would be very hard to reor-
ganise such a large part of the country’s export. The best option would probably be the 
US, which currently has a non-reciprocal free trade agreement with Kenya (ITA, 2015); 
despite this the US only makes up 8.2 per cent of Kenyan exports (OEC, 2012). Overall, 
replacing the EU markets thus seems to be a infeasible option for Kenyan exporters. 
6.2 Between a Rock and a Hard Place: International Competition 
EU presents the EPA as a comprehensive and good agreement for the EAC, which  
[...] is balanced and has what it takes to foster development. The deal is fully in line 
with the EAC Common External Tariff and supports the EAC’s ambitious regional 
integration project (DG Trade, 2014).  
                                                             
22 By far the largest African importers of Kenyan goods are rest of the EAC (KAM, 2015). 
23 Kenyan low export to China and India is in stark contrast to the country’s import as 57 per cent of the 
Kenyan import comes from the two countries (OEC, 2012).  
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However, applying the literature of Raphael Kaplinsky (2005) to the equation the EPA 
might not be as good for the Kenyan economy as the EU presents it to be. While the 
Kenyan economy is still a growing (Masinde, 2015) it took a hard hit by those months 
without the MAR regime. Exporters lost market shares that they are not expecting to 
regain. As the fresh produce exporter mentioned, the result was that his company had 
to terminate the contracts with a thousand small-scale farmers whom had supplied the 
company affecting an estimated 5,000 people’s livelihood (Field notes, 2015). These 
suppliers now have no market, but the local ones, to sell their products on. Having 
been moved to less profitable markets and been pushed out of the global value chain, 
they will experience a drop in income (Field notes, 2015), and can thus be said to have 
been downgraded24.  
“When you lose a market you will never get it back” (Field notes, 2015), so the export-
ers have to look for new markets and here are the emerging markets, like the Chinese, 
the better opportunities (Field notes, 2015). However, with the global competition, it 
can be difficult for Kenya to compete with products from China or India – even on the 
European market – because these dominant players have established themselves on 
these markets. Kaplinsky expresses this as a global tendencies; “they are caught be-
tween a rock and a hard place, that is, between growing production capabilities 
around the world and the increasingly concentrated power of global buyers” (Kaplin-
sky, 2005:194).  
As lead firms are dominant in defining demands through standards in the buyer-
driven value chains, small-scale farmers and suppliers for ‘less efficient producers’ will 
risk of being left behind in a liberalised word economy:  
...in a world of excess capacity and structural unemployment, some countries such 
as China may succeed in this outward orientation. This will leave little space for 
other less efficient producers - notably those in Africa and large parts of Latin Amer-
ica (Kaplinsky, 2005:231).  
If the liberalisation of the Kenyan economy leads to an increasing number of small-
scale farmers and other suppliers being lost or pushed down in the global value chain 
                                                             
24 ’Downgrading’ is not a term used in GVC theory. We have here used the word ‘downgrading’ be-
cause what happens to the suppliers it to some extent the opposite of ‘upgrading’. 
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due for foreign competition can Kenya and the EAC risk moving to lower value activi-
ties in the global value chain (downgrading) instead of to higher value activities (up-
grading). 
6.3 Not the Best of Friends 
The competition between the countries within the EAC could also have had an effect 
on the EPA negotiations. Kenya’s loss of market shares on the horticulture exports 
have largely been picked up by countries in West Africa and within the EAC, like Tan-
zania (Field notes, 2005). The other EAC countries have thus benefitted from Kenya’s 
loss of market access, giving them a reason to prolong the negotiations (Chao-Blasto, 
2015). 
Even for Kenya, with the highest stakes in the negotiations, it was difficult not to pri-
oritise self-interests: “So, we were not so much approaching the other EAC partner-
states, though we had agreed that we would move as an economic bloc, mostly to-
gether, there was [a] need for Kenya to also put its interest first” (KAM, 2015). This 
underline the EAC’s difficulties to act as a joint group against EU.  
This is also obvious in other cases. Despite the EAC’s attempt to establish a custom’s 
union with a provision on free movement of goods (EAC, 2004) Kenya and Tanzania 
still have issues regarding transport of goods across their borders (de Vroey, 2015). 
The relationship between Tanzania and Kenya is especially competitive regarding the 
regional infrastructure. Both governments are expanding their logistic capabilities 
hoping to build the primary commercial port on the East African cost. Not only serving 
the EAC area, but also for the land-locked countries of Central Africa. The seaport lo-
gistics in Mombasa, Kenya, and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, are currently being ex-
panded for 13 billion and 10 billion respectively (Richardson, 2013). These difficulties 
will continue in the future, and affect the EAC region’s possibilities for continued re-
gional integration:  
[...] ambitious integration process claiming monetary union and politically in the 
years to come which is unrealistic if you look at the reality. So I think on paper they 
have a lot of, they want to achieve a lot of integration but in reality, it is far from 
being the case.” (De Vroey, 2015)  
The competition is an important part of the understanding of the globalised world to-
day and its effects on the EAC. How, if at all, this have affected the comprehensive EPA 
60 
 
and the negotiation process is speculations, but if the regional rivalries have had an 
effect, it could have been influential. 
6.1 Summery  
There are a number of issues that could have influenced our subject and research field, 
which have not been examined in this paper. We have tried to capture three points, 
which can give us a better understanding of especially Kenya and EAC’s interest in the 
EPA. 
Kenya is depended on exporting to the EU markets for its horticultural product, be-
cause of the massive market shares and purchase power EU accounts for. That is not 
to say, that Kenya could not have made a political decision to abandon the EU markets, 
but it would probably have been disastrous for the country’s economy.  
The small-scale farmers suffered the most, during the three months without MAR and 
many had their contracts as suppliers terminated and experiences a ‘downgrading’ 
compared to previous. The Kenyan exporters may be affected too, as they have to reach 
out to new markets. The long term results both for Kenya’s horticultural export and 
overall economy is yet to be seen, but the liberalisation of the market creates a risk that 
global giants like will outcompete Kenyan exporters on these new markets. Tanzania 
and other countries have already taken some of Kenya’s export markets in EU. This 
interregional competition between the EAC countries and its effects have not been ex-
amined here, but we see tendencies to competition. This competition might have in-
fluenced the EPA negotiations and could be a barrier for the regional integration EU 
hope the EPA will foster.  
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Chapter 7  
Conclusion    
 
 
This paper started by presenting a case where EU had put heavy pressure on the EAC 
to finalise negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreement, which was not unam-
biguously favourable towards the EAC members. To examine this case further, we have 
singled out Kenya, as the EAC member-state with the most to lose should the EPA not 
be signed, in order to answer the following question: How can we understand the Eu-
ropean Union’s interest in signing the Economic Partnership Agreement with the 
East African Community, and – conversely – the interest in signing from the East 
African Community? To qualify the relatively broad question we have asked, we have 
taken an approach based on transnational historic materialism, narrowing the context 
within which we understand the field of global political economy.  
We have shown that EU is embedded in, and an important part of, a neoliberal hegem-
ony, governing the economic world order. As part of the hegemony – also consisting 
of TNC’s, international organisations such as the WTO, IMF and the World Bank, and 
the G7 countries – EU is able to influence different global norms, politics and policies. 
Connected, through the transnational capitalist class, the hegemony is able to stream-
line this influence and diffuse these neoliberal norms, politics and policies throughout 
the rest of the world. 
Understanding EU’s position as part of the hegemony also enable us to understand 
how the EPA works as a feature of the hegemony, spreading neoliberalism through 
liberalisation of trade and markets, deregulations and changing local polities from 
driven by the state’s authority to the market’s. EU’s main interest in signing the EPA 
with the EAC is to push an agenda of further liberalisation of the East African markets 
and thus spreading the neoliberalism that is a cornerstone in EU itself. In this way, EU 
is promoting and strengthening the hegemony and its own position as a part of it.  
Keeping the historical bonds between important EU states, East African countries in 
particular and the APC countries in general, in mind these regions have close ties with 
EU making them apparent as regions where EU easily can spread hegemonic norms, 
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politics and policies to, due to the local economies’ high dependency on EU markets. 
It is also important to notice that the EPA’s have their origin in development agree-
ments and the overall connection to EU is influential by how the trade agreements 
positioned EU as the dominant party that could dominate the negotiations’ outcomes. 
Reviewing Kenya government's policies and the statements show that the Vision 2030 
and the foreign and trade policies are in line with the neoliberal norms of trade existing 
today, and that Kenya have been quick to accept neoliberal loans in the past. The WTO 
dominates this understanding of trade; nevertheless, there are also issues where the 
government identities evident challenges regarding control of the national budgets 
and the countries revenue. 
The duty-free and quota-free access to the EU markets are very important, for both the 
Kenyan government and the country’s exporters. The inconvenience of being catego-
rised as a non-LDC country resulting in Kenya being relegated to EU’s General Scheme 
of Preference (GSP) rules as part of a negotiation described as ‘bullying’. This was 
simply too high of a cost, to give Kenya an actually choice of whether to initialling the 
EPA or not. The negative effects on the main exporting industries, cut flower and fresh 
produce, were all too well illustrated during the three months where the free trade 
privileges were removed; many small-scale farmers lost their contracts with local ex-
porters as their sales plummeted due to lost market-shares in their primary markets – 
the EU’s.  
While there were no strong interference with the negotiations from the lead firms in 
Europe, most of the groundwork had already been done by imposing voluntary stand-
ards on Kenyan exporters. This made it easier for EU to enforce formal standards in 
the EPA as Kenyan exporters to some degree had already implemented relatively high 
standards to gain a competitive advantage. That Kenya had some competitive ad-
vantages was confirmed by the Kenyan industrial associations, who lobbied not for 
changes in the EPA, but for a speedy conclusion of the negotiations. 
Kenya’s incentive to agree to the EPA was thus three fold. The countries politicians 
and bureaucrats had already accepted the hegemonic policies of the WTO. The cost of 
not initialling the EPA was too high, as EU would not accept non-reciprocal trade 
agreements. Lastly, Kenyan industries believe they are able to compete on a liberalised 
global market. 
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The EPA between EU and the EAC also confirms that the global hegemony work 
through both consent and cohesion. Large parts of Kenyan government and society 
wanted liberalised market-access to EU and were willing to accept the liberalisation of 
their own markets. However, negotiating the technicalities EU had to resort to heavy 
pressure, by removing Kenyan free trade privileges, in order to get the EPA initialled. 
In the end, Kenya had few other options than to initialling the EPA, so while the nego-
tiations went into injury time, the match’s result was fixed from the beginning. 
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